Weapons of Mass Destruction. Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. They're really nasty, right?
Well, some of them are. Nuclear weapons are Very Destructive Indeed. Even a tiny one, detonated in the middle of a major city, would probably kill hundreds of thousands. A medium-sized nuke could kill millions. The biggest would wipe a small country off the map in one go.
Chemical and biological weapons, on the other hand, while hardly nice, are just not on the same scale.
Sure, there are nightmare scenarios - a genetically engineered supervirus that kills a billion people - but they're hypothetical. If someone does design such a virus, then we can worry. As it is, biological weapons have never proven very useful. The 2001 US anthrax letters killed 5 people. Jared Loughner killed 6 with a gun he bought from a chain store.
Chemical weapons are little better. They were used heavily in WW1 and the Iran-Iraq War against military targets and killed many but never achieved a decisive victory, and the vast majority of deaths in these wars were caused by plain old bullets and bombs. Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Kurds in Halabja killed perhaps 5,000 - but this was a full-scale assault by an advanced air force, lasting several hours, on a defenceless population.
When a state-of-the-art nerve agent was used in the Tokyo subway attack, after much preparation by the cult responsible, who had professional chemists and advanced labs, 13 people died. In London on the 7th July 2005, terrorists killed 52 people with explosives made from haircare products.
Nuclear weapons aside, the best way to cause mass destruction is just to make an explosion, the bigger the better; yet conventional explosives, no matter how big, are not "WMDs", while chemical and biological weapons are.
So it seems to me that the term and the concept of "WMDs" is fundamentally unhelpful. It lumps together the apocalyptically powerful with the much less destructive. If you have to discuss everything except guns and explosives in one category, terms like "Unconventional weapons" are better as they avoid the misleading implication that all of these weapons are very, and equivalently, deadly; but grouping them together at all is risky.
That's WMDs. But there are plenty of other unhelpful concepts out there, some of which I've discussed previously. Take the concept of "major depressive disorder", for example. At least as the term is currently used, it lumps together extremely serious cases requiring hospitalization with mild "symptoms" which 40% of people experience by age 32.
WMDs vs MDD
09.40
wsn
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The Social Network and Anorexia
14.00
wsn
Could social networks be more important than the media in the spread of eating disorders?There's a story about eating disorders roughly like this: eating disorders (ED) are about wanting to be thin. The idea that thinness is desireable is something that's spread by Western media, especially visual media i.e. TV and magazines. Therefore, Western media exposure causes eating disorders.
It's a nice simple theory. And it seems to fit with the fact that eating disorders, hitherto very rare, start to appear in a certain country in conjunction with the spread of Westernized media. A number of studies have shown this. However, a new paper suggests that there may be rather more to it: Social network media exposure and adolescent eating pathology in Fiji.
Fiji is a former British colony, a tropical island nation of less than a million. Just over half the population are ethnic native Fijian people. Until recently, these Fijians were relatively untouched by Western culture, but this is starting to change.
The authors of this study surveyed 523 Fijian high school girls. Interviews took place in 2007. They asked them various questions relating to, one the one hand, eating disorder symptoms, and on the other hand, their exposure to various forms of media.
They looked at both individual exposure - hours of TV watched, electronic entertainment in the home - and "indirect" or "social network" exposure, such as TV watched by the parents, and the amount of electronic entertainment their friends owned. On top of this they measured Westernization/"globalization", such as the amount of overseas travel by the girls or their parents.
So what happened? Basically, social network media exposure, urbanization, and Westernization correlated with ED symptoms, but when you controlled for those variables, personal media exposure didn't correlate. Here's the data; the column I've highlighted is the data where each variable is controlled for the others. The correlations are pretty small (0 is none, 1.0 would be perfect) but significant.
They conclude that:
Although consistent with the prevailing sociocultural model for the relation between media exposure and disordered eating... our finding, that indirect exposure to media content may be even more influential than direct exposure in this particular social context, is novel.The idea that eating disorders are simply a product of a culture which values thinness as attractive has always seemed a bit shaky to me because people with anorexia frequently starve themselves far past the point of being attractive even by the unrealistic standards of magazines and movies.
In fact, if eating disorders were just an attempt to "look good", they wouldn't be nearly so dangerous as they are, because no matter how thin-obsessed our culture may be, no-one thinks this is attractive, or normal, or sane. But this, or worse, is what a lot of anorexics end up as.
On the other hand, eating disorders are associated with modern Western culture. There must be a link, but maybe it's more complicated than just "thin = good" causes anorexia. What if you also need the idea of "eating disorders"?
This was the argument put forward by Ethan Watters in Crazy Like Us (my review)... in his account of the rise of anorexia in Hong Kong. Essentially, he said, anorexia was vanishingly rare in Hong Kong until after the much-publicized death of a 14 year old girl, Charlene Chi-Ying, in the street. As he put it:
In trying to explain what happened to Charlene, local reporters often simply copied out of American diagnostic manuals. The mental-health experts quoted in the Hong Kong papers and magazines confidently reported that anorexia in Hong Kong was the same disorder that appeared in the United States and Europe...Now it's important not to see this as trivializing the condition or as a way of blaming the victim; "they're just following a trend!". You only have to look at someone with anorexia to see that there is nothing trivial about it. However, that doesn't mean it's not a social phenomenon.
As the general public and the region's mental-health professionals came to understand the American diagnosis of anorexia, the presentation of the illness in [Hong Kong psychiatrist] Lee's patient population appeared to transform into the more virulent American standard. Lee once saw two or three anorexic patients a year; by the end of the 1990s he was seeing that many new cases each month.
It's a long way from the data in this study to Watters' conclusions, but maybe not an impossible leap. Part of Westernization, after all, is exposure to Western ideas about what is healthy eating and what's an eating disorder...
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Left Wing vs. Right Wing Brains
08.50
wsn
So apparently: Left wing or right wing? It's written in the brain
People with liberal views tended to have increased grey matter in the anterior cingulate cortex, a region of the brain linked to decision-making, in particular when conflicting information is being presented...
Conservatives, meanwhile, had increased grey matter in the amygdala, an area of the brain associated with processing emotion.
Politics blog Heresy Corner discusses it...
Subjects who professed liberal or left-wing opinions tended to have a larger anterior cingulate cortex, an area of the brain which, we were told, helps process complex and conflicting information. (Perhaps they need this extra grey matter to be able to cope with the internal contradictions of left-wing philosophy.)
In truth, without seeing the full scientific paper, we can't know whether the differences they found were really statistically solid, or whether they were voodoo or fishy. The authors, Geraint Rees and Ryota Kanai, have both published a lot of excellent neuroscience in the past, but that's no guarantee.
In fact, however, I suspect that the brain is just the wrong place to look if you're interested in politics, because most political views don't originate in the individual brain, they originate in the wider culture and are absorbed and regurgitated without much thought. This is a real shame, because all of us, left or right, have a brain, and it's really quite nifty:
But when it comes to politics we generally don't use it. The brain is a powerful organ designed to help you deal with reality in all its complexity. For a lot of people, politics doesn't take place there, it happens in fairytale kingdoms populated by evil monsters, foolish jesters, and brave knights.
Given that the characters in this story are mindless stereotypes, there's no need for empathy. Because the plot comes fully-formed from TV or a newspaper, there's no need for original ideas. Because everything is either obviously right or obviously wrong, there's not much reasoning required. And so on. Which is why this happens amongst other things.I don't think individual personality is very important in determining which political narratives and values you adopt: your family background, job, and position in society is much more important.
Where individual differences matter, I think, is in deciding how "conservative" or "radical" you are within whatever party you find yourself. Not in the sense of left or right, but in terms of how keen you are on grand ideas and big changes, as opposed to cautious, boring pragmatism.
In this sense, there are conservative liberals (i.e. Obama) and radical conservatives (i.e. Palin), and that's the kind of thing I'd be looking for if I were trying to find political differences in the brain.
Links: If right wingers have bigger amygdalae, does that mean patient SM, the woman with no amygdalae at all, must be a communist? Then again, Neuroskeptic readers may remember that the brain itself is a communist...
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Wikileaks: A Conversation
04.30
wsn
"Wikileaks is great. It lets people leak stuff."
"Hang on, so you're saying that no-one could leak stuff before? They invented it?"
"Well, no, but they brought leaking to the masses. Sure, people could post documents to the press before, but now anyone in the world can access the leaks!"
"Great, but isn't that just the internet that did that? If it weren't for Wikileaks, people could just upload their leaks to a blog. Or email them to 50 newspapers. Or put them on the torrents. Or start their own site. If it's good, it would go viral, and be impossible to take down. Just like Wikileaks, with all their mirrors, except even more secure, because there'd be literally no-one to arrest or cut off funding to."
"OK, but Wikileaks is a brand. It's not about the technical stuff - it's the message. Like one of their wallpapers says, they're synonymous with free speech."
"So you think it's a good thing that one organization has become synonymous with the whole process of leaking? With the whole concept of openness? What will happen to the idea of free speech, then, if that brand image suddenly gets tarnished - like, say, if their founder and figurehead gets convicted of a serious crime, or..."
"He's innocent! Justice for Julian!"
"Quite possibly, but why do you care? Is he a personal friend?"
"It's an attack on free speech!"
"So you agree that one man has become synonymous with free speech? Doesn't that bother you?"
"Erm... well. Look, fundamentally, we need Wikileaks. Before, there was no centralized system for leaking. Anyone could do it. It was a mess! Wikileaks put everything in one place, and put a committee of experts in a position to decide what was worth leaking and what wasn't. It brought much-needed efficiency and respectability to the idea of leaking. Before Wikileaks, it was anarchy. They're like... the government."
"..."
Edit: See also The Last Psychiatrist's take.
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Online Comments: It's Not You, It's Them
04.15
wsn
Last week I was at a discussion about New Media, and someone mentioned that they'd been put off from writing content online because of a comment on one of their articles accusing them of being "stupid".
I found this surprising - not the comment, but that anyone would take it so personally. It's the internet. You will get called names. Everyone does. It doesn't mean there's anything wrong with you.
I suspect this is a generational issue. People who 'grew up online' know, as Penny Arcade explained, that
The sad fact is that there are millions of people whose idea of fun is to find people they disagree with, and mock them. And they're right, it can be fun - why else do you think people like Jon Stewart are so popular? - but that's all it is, entertainment. If you're on the receiving end, don't take it seriously.
If you write something online, and a lot of people read it, you will get slammed. Someone, somewhere, will disagree with you and they'll tell you so, in no uncertain terms. This is true whatever you write about, but some topics are like a big red rag to the herds of bulls out there.
Just to name a few, if you say anything vaguely related to climate change, religion, health, the economy, feminism or race, you might as well be holding a placard with a big arrow pointing down at you and "Sling Mud Here" on it.
The point is - it's them, not you. They are not interested in you, they don't know you, it's not you. True, they might tailor their insults a bit; if you're a young woman you might be, say, a "stupid girl" where a man would merely get called an "idiot". But this doesn't mean that the attacks are a reflection on you in any way. You just happen to be the one in the line of fire.
What do you do about this? Nothing.
Trying to enter into a serious debate is pointless. Insulting them back can be fun, just remember that if you find it fun, you've become one of them: "he who stares too long into the abyss...", etc. Complaining to the moderators might help, but unless the site has a rock solid zero-tolerance-for-fuckwads policy, probably not. Where the blight has taken root, like Comment is Free, I'd not waste your time complaining. Just ignore it and carry on.
The most important thing is not to take it personally. Do not get offended. Do not care. Because no-one else cares. Especially the people who wrote the comments. They presumably care about whatever "issue" prompted their attack, but they don't care about you. If anything, you should be pleased, because on the internet, the only stuff that doesn't attract stupid comments is the stuff that no-one reads.
I've heard these attacks referred to as "policing" existing hierarchies or "silencing" certain types of people. This seems to me to be granting them far more respect than they deserve. With the actual police, if you break the rules, they will physically arrest you. They have power. Internet trolls don't: if they succeed in policing or silencing anybody, it's because their targets let them boss them around. They're nobody; they're not your problem.
If you can't help being offended by such comments, don't read them, but ideally you shouldn't need to resort to that. For one thing, it means you miss the sensible comments (and there's always a few). But fundamentally, you shouldn't need to do this, because you really shouldn't care what some anonymous joker from the depths of the internet thinks about you.
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Israel and Palestine are Both Fighting Back...?
05.30
wsn
There are three basic schools of thought on the Israel / Palestine thing.
- Those evil Israelis are out to destroy Palestine, and the Palestinians are just fighting back.
- Those evil Palestinians are out to destroy Israel, and the Israelis are just fighting back.
- It's a cycle of violence, where both sides are fighting back against the other.
Wouldn't it be handy if science could provide an answer? According to the authors of a new paper in Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, the "cycle" school is right: both sides are fighting back against the other: Both sides retaliate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The authors (from Switzerland, Israel and the USA) took data on daily fatalities on both sides, and also of daily launches of Palestinian "Qassam" rockets at Israel. The data run from 2001, the start of the current round of unpleasantness, to late 2008, the Gaza War.
They looked to see whether the number of events that happened on a certain day predicted the number of events caused by the other side on the following days, i.e. whether a Palestinian death caused the Palestinians to retaliate by firing more rockets and killing more Israelis, and vice versa.
What happened? They found that both sides were more likely to launch attacks on the days following a death on their own side. The exception to this rule was that Israel did not noticeably retaliate against Qassam launches. This is perhaps because Qassams are so ineffective: out of 3,645 recorded launches, they killed 15 people.
These graphs show the number of "extra" actions on the days following a event, averaged over the whole 8 years, according to a statistical method called the Impulse Response Function. Note that the absolute size of the effects is larger for the Israeli retaliations (the Y axis is bigger); there were a total of 4,874 Palestinian fatalities and 1,062 Israeli fatalitiesThe authors then used another method called Vector Autoregression to discover more about the relationship. In theory, this method controls for the past history of actions by a given side, so that it reveals the number of actions independently caused by the opposing side.
the number of Qassams fired increases by 6% on the first day after a single killing of a Palestinian by Israel; the probability of any Qassams being fired increases by 11%; and the probability of any Israelis being killed by Palestinians increases by 10%. Conversely, 1 day after the killing of a single Israeli by Palestinians, the number of Palestinians killed by Israel increases by 9%, and the probability of any Palestinians being killed increases by 20%What are we to make of this? This is a good paper as far as it goes, and it casts doubt on earlier analyses finding that Israel is retaliating against Palestinians but not vice versa. However, the inherent problem with all of this research (beyond the fact that it's all based on correlations and can only indirectly imply causation), is that it focuses on individual acts of violence. The authors say, citing surveys, that
....retaliation accounts for a larger fraction of Palestinian compared with Israeli aggression: in the levels specification, 10% of all Qassam rockets can be attributed to prior Israeli attacks on Palestinians, but only 4% of killings of Palestinians by Israel can be attributed to prior Palestinian attacks on Israel.... 6% of all days on which Palestinians attack Israel with rockets, and 5% of all days on which they attack by killing Israelis, can be attributed to retaliation; in contrast, this is true for only 2% of all days on which Israel kills Palestinians.
Over one half of Israelis and three quarters of Palestinians think the other side seeks to take over their land. When accounting for their own acts of aggression, Israelis often claim to be merely responding to Palestinian violence, and Palestinians often see themselves as simply reacting to Israeli violence.But I don't think many Israelis would argue that the IDF only kills individual Palestinians as a reflex reaction to a particular attack. They're claiming that the whole conflict is a defensive one, that the Palestinians are the aggressors, but that doesn't rule out their taking the initiative on a tactical level e.g. in destroying Palestinian military capabilities before they have a chance to attack. And vice versa on the other side.
WW2 was a war of aggression by the Axis powers, but that doesn't mean that the Allies only killed Axis soldiers after they'd attacked a certain place. The Allies were on the offensive for the second half of the war, and eventually invaded the Axis's own homelands, but it was still a defensive war, because the Axis were responsible for it.
For Israel and for Palestine, the other guys are to blame for the whole thing. Who's right, if anyone, is fundamentally a historical, political and ethical question, that can't be answered by looking at day-to-day variations in who's shooting when.
Comment Policy: Please only comment if you've got something to say about this paper, or related research. Comments that are just making the case for or against Israel will get deleted.
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How To Sell An Idea
02.35
wsn
You've got an idea: a new way of doing things; a change; a paradigm shift. It might work, it might be no better than what we've got already, or it might end up being a disaster.
The honest way to present your proposal would be to admit its novelty, and hence the uncertainty: this is a new idea I had, I can't promise anything, but here are my reasons for thinking it's worth a try, here are the likely costs and benefits, here are the alternatives.
However, let's suppose you don't want to do that. That's hard work, and if your idea is crap, people could tell. How else could you convince them? By making it seem as though it's not a new idea at all.
You could dress your idea up as:
- the glorious past. Your idea is nothing more than how we did things back in the golden age, when everything was great. For some reason, people strayed from the true path, and things went bad. We should go back to the the good old days. It worked then, so it'll work now. You'll use words like: restoring, reviving, regaining, renewing... "re" is your friend.
- the next step. Your idea is just the logical progression of what we're already doing. Things used to be bad, and then they started to change, and get better. Let's make them even better, by doing more of the same. It's inevitable, anyway: you can't stop history. You'll use words like: progress, forward, advance, build, grow...
- catching up. You're just saying we should bring stuff into line with the way things are done elsewhere, which as we know, is working well. It's not even a matter of moving forward, so much as keeping up. It would be weird not to change. We don't want to be dinosaurs. You'll use words like: modernization, rationalization, reform...
- keeping things the same. Things are fine right now, and don't need improving. But in order for things to stay great, we must adapt to changing circumstances, so we'll have to make a few adjustments, but don't worry, fundamentally things are going to stay just as they are. You'll use words like: preserving, maintaining, protecting, upholding, strengthening...
Of course, there are plenty of changes that really are these things, to various degrees. Sometimes the past was glorious, relatively speaking (France 1942 springs to mind); sometimes we do need to catch up.
But every new idea still has an element of risk. Nothing has ever been tried and tested in the exact circumstances that we face now, because those circumstances have never existed before. Just because it worked before, or elsewhere, in a situation that we think is similar, is no guarantee. There are only degrees of certainty.
This doesn't mean we can't decide what to do, or that we shouldn't change anything. Not changing things is a plan of action in itself, anyway. The point is that we ought to be willing to try stuff that might not work, our guide to what's likely to happen being the evidence on what's worked before, critically appraised. "I don't know" is not a dirty phrase.
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"Koran Burning"
07.16
wsn
Koran protests sweep Afghanistan... Thousands of protesters have taken to the streets across Afghanistan... Three people were shot when a protest near a Nato base in the north-east of the country turned violent.Wow. That's a lot of fuss about, literally, nothing - the Koran burning hasn't happened. So what are they angry about? The "Koran Burning" - the mere idea of it. That has happened, of course - it's been all over the news.
Why? Well, obviously, it's a big deal. People are getting shot protesting about it in Afghanistan. It's news, so of course the media want to talk about it. But all they're talking about is themselves: the news is that everyone is talking about the news which is that everyone is talking about...
A week ago no-one had heard of Pastor Jones. The only way he could become newsworthy is if he did something important. But what he was proposing to do was not, in itself, important: he was going to burn a Koran in front of a handful of like-minded people.
No-one would have cared about that, because the only people who'd have known about it would have been the participants. Muslims wouldn't have cared, because they would never have heard about it. "Someone You've Never Heard Of Does Something" - not much of a headline.
But as soon as it became news, it was news. Once he'd appeared on CNN, say, every other news outlet was naturally going to cover the story because by then people did care. If something's on CNN, it's news, by definition. Clever, eh?
What's odd is that Jones actually announced his plans way back in July; no-one took much notice at the time. Google Trends shows that interest began to build only in late August, peaking on August 22nd, but then falling off almost to zero.
What triggered the first peak? It seems to have been the decision of the local fire department to deny a permit for the holy book bonfire, on August 18th. (There were just 6 English-language news hits between the 1st and the 17th.)
It all kicked off when the Associated Press reported about the fire department's decision on August 18th and was quickly followed up by everyone else; the AP credit the story to the local paper The Gainsville Sun who covered the story on the same day.
But in their original article, the Sun wrote that Pastor Jones had already made "international headlines" over the event. Indeed there were a number of articles about it in late July following Jones's original Facebook announcement. But interest then disappeared - there was virtually nothing about it in the first half of August, remember.
So there was, it seems, nothing inevitable about this story going global. It had a chance to become a big deal in late July - and it didn't. It had another shot in mid-August, and it got a bit of press that time, but then it all petered out.
Only this week has the story become massive. US commander in Afghanistan General Petraeus spoke out on September 6th; ironically, just before the story finally exploded, since as you can see on the Google Trends above, searches were basically zero up until September 7th when they went through the roof.
So the "Koran Burning" story had three chances to become front-page global news and it only succeeded on the third try. Why? The easy answer is that it's an immediate issue now, because the burning is planned for 11th September - tomorrow. But I wonder if that's one of those post hoc explanations that makes whatever random stuff that happened seem inevitable in retrospect.
The whole story is newsworthy only because it's news, remember. The more attention it gets, the more it attracts. Presumably, therefore, there's a certain critical mass, the famous Tipping Point, after which it's unstoppable. This happened around September 6th, and not in late July or mid August.
But there's a random factor: every given news outlet who might run the story, might decide not to; maybe it doesn't have space because something more important happened, or because the Religion correspondent was off sick that day, etc. Whether a story reaches the critical mass is down to luck, in other words.
The decision of a single journalist on the 5th or the 6th might well have been what finally tipped it.
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Carlat's Unhinged
04.45
wsn
Well he's not. Actually, I haven't met him, so it's always possible. But what he certainly has done is written a book called Unhinged: The Trouble with Psychiatry.
Daniel Carlat's best known online for the Carlat Psychiatry Blog and in the real world for the Carlat Psychiatry Report. Unhinged is his first book for a general audience, though he's previously written several technical works aimed at doctors. It comes hot on the heels of a number of other recent books offering more or less critical perspectives on modern psychiatry, notably these ones.
Unhinged offers a sweeping overview of the whole field. If you're looking for a detailed examination of the problems around, say, psychiatric diagnosis, you'd do well to read Crazy Like Us as well. But as an overview it's a very readable and comprehensive one, and Carlat covers many topics that readers of his blog, or indeed of this one, would expect: the medicalization of normal behaviour, to over-diagnosis, the controversy over pediatric psychopharmacology, brain imaging and the scientific state of biological psychiatry, etc.
Carlat is unique amongst authors of this mini-genre, however, in that he is himself a practising psychiatrist, and moreover, an American one. This is important, because almost everyone agrees that to the extent that there is a problem with psychiatry, American psychiatry has it worst of all: it's the country that gave us the notorious DSM-IV, where drugs are advertised direct-to-the-consumer, where children are diagnosed with bipolar and given antipsychotics, etc.
So Carlat is well placed to report from the heart of darkness and he doesn't disappoint, as he vividly reveals how dizzying sums of drug company money sway prescribing decisions and even create diseases out of thin air. His confessional account of his own time as a paid "representative" for the antidepressant Effexor (also discussed in the NYT), and of his dealings with other reps - the Paxil guy, the Cymbalta woman - have to be read to be believed. We're left with the inescapable conclusion that psychiatry, at least in America, is institutionally corrupt.
Conflict of interest is a tricky thing though. Everyone in academia and medicine has mentors, collaborators, people who work in the office next door. The social pressure against saying or publishing anything that explicitly or implicitly criticizes someone else is powerful. Of course, there are rivalries and controversies, but they're firmly the exception.
The rule is: don't rock the boat. And given that in psychiatry, all but a few of the leading figures have at least some links to industry, that means everyone's in the same boat with Pharma, even the people who don't, personally, accept drug company money. I think this is often overlooked in all the excitement over individual scandals.
For all this, Carlat is fairly conservative in his view of psychiatric drugs. They work, he says, a lot of the time, but they're rarely the whole answer. Most people need therapy, too. His conclusion is that psychiatrists need to spend more time getting to know their patients, instead of just handing out pills and then doing a 15 minute "med check" - a great way of making money when you're getting paid per patient (4 patients per hour: ker-ching!), but probably not a great way of treating people.
In other words, psychiatrists need to be psychotherapists as well as psychopharmacologists. It's not enough to just refer people to someone else for the therapy: in order to treat mental illness you need one person with the skills to address both the biological and the psychological aspects of the patient's problems. Plus, patients often find it frustrating being bounced back and forth between professionals, and it's a recipe for confusion ("My psychiatrist says this but my therapist says...")This leads Carlat to the controversial conclusion that psychiatrists should no longer have a monopoly on prescribing medications. He supports the idea of (appropriately trained) prescribing psychologists, an idea which has taken off in a few US states but which is hotly debated.
As he puts it, for a psychiatrist, the years in medical school spent delivering babies and dissecting kidneys are rarely useful. So there's no reason why a therapist can't learn the necessary elements of psychopharmacology - which drugs do what, how to avoid dangerous drug interactions - in say one or two years.
Such a person would be at least as good as a psychiatrist at providing integrated pills-and-therapy care. In fact, he says, an even better option would be to design an entirely new type of training program to create such "integrated" mental health professionals from the ground up - neither doctors nor therapists but something combining the best aspects of both.
There does seem to be a paradox here, however: Carlat has just spent 200 pages explaining how drug companies distort the evidence and bribe doctors in order to push their latest pills at people, many of whom either don't need medication or would do equally well with older, much cheaper drugs. Now he's saying that more people should be licensed to prescribe the same pills? Whose side is he on?
In fact, Carlat's position is perfectly coherent: his concern is to give patients the best possible care, which is, he thinks, combined medication and therapy. So he is not "anti" or "pro-medication" in any simple sense. But still, if psychiatry has been corrupted by drug company money, what's to stop the exact same thing happening to psychologists as soon as they got the ability to prescribe?
I think the answer to this can only be that we must first cut the problem off at its source by legislation. We simply shouldn't allow drug companies the freedom to manipulate opinion in the way that they do. It's not inevitable: we can regulate them. The US leads the world in some areas: since 2007, all clinical trials conducted in the country must be pre-registered, and the results made available on a public website, clinicaltrials.gov.
The benefits, in terms of keeping drug manufacturer's honest, are far too many to explain here. Other places, like the European Union, are just starting to follow suit. But America suffers from a split personality in this regard. It's also one of the only countries to allow direct-to-consumer drug advertising, for example. Until the US gets serious about restraining Pharma influence in all its forms, giving more people prescribing rights might only aggravate the problem.
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Flibbin Heck
15.55
wsn
It's not been a great day for Germany. First, they lost to Serbia in the footy. Then German pharmaceutical company Boehringer Ingelheim suffered an equally vexing setback after their allegedly libido-boosting new drug, flibanserin, failed to get approval to be sold in the US.
The FDA panel's unanimous decision was no surprise to anyone who read their briefing report which came a few days ago (here) as it was pretty scathing about the strength of the evidence that Boehringer submitted in support of the drug's efficacy. Take this bit (from page 38)
Although the two North American trials that used the flibanserin 100 mg dose showed a statistically significant difference between flibanserin and placebo for the endpoint of Sexually Satisfying Events, they both failed to demonstrate a statistically significant improvement on the co-primary endpoint of sexual desire. Therefore, neither study met the agreed-upon criteria for success in establishing the efficacy of flibanserin for the treatment of Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder (HSDD).
At issue and a major concern of the Division are the following findings:
- The trials did not show a statistically significant difference for the co-primary endpoint, the eDiary sexual desire score.
- The Applicant’s request to use the FSFI [a questionnaire] desire items as the alternative instrument to evaluate the co-primary endpoint of sexual desire is not statistically justified and, in fact, was not supported by exploratory data from Study 511.77, which also failed to demonstrate a statistically significant treatment benefit on desire using the FSFI desire items.
- The responder rates on the important efficacy endpoints for the flibanserin-treated subjects, intended to demonstrate the clinical meaningfulness, are only 3-15% greater than those in the placebo arm.
- There were many significant medical and medication exclusion criteria for the efficacy trials, so it is not clear whether the safety and efficacy data from these trials are generalizable to the target population for the drug.
But what was flibanserin supposed to treat in the first place? Something called "hypoactive sexual desire disorder" (HSDD). What is hypoactive sexual desi...oh, hang on. I think I can work it out. It's a disorder where you have hypoactive sexual desire. The clue is in the name.
The truth of course is that it's more than a clue: HSDD is nothing more than its name. And in fact, the "disorder" bit is entirely superfluous, and the "hypoactive" is needlessly technical. HSDD is simply a description for low sexual desire.
As such, it is wrong to say that it doesn't exist - clearly some people do have low sexual desire, and some of them (though not all) would prefer to have more. But giving it a fancy name and calling it a disorder is entirely misleading: it gives the impression of depth (i.e. that this is some kind of medical illness) when in fact it is simply describing a surface phenomena, like saying "I'm bored" or "I'm tired".
Psychiatry - or more specifically the DSM-IV textbook of the American Psychiatric Association - is chock full of these the-clue-is-in-the-name disorders. Essentially, if the symptoms of the condition are simply summarized in the name, it's almost certainly of this type. You have "Generalized Anxiety Disorder" if you're... generally anxious. According to the next DSM-5, your kid will have "Temper Regulation Disorder with Dysphoria" if... oh, guess.
Not all psychiatric disorders are like this though. The word "Schizophrenia" is just a name: it describes a cluster of quite diverse symptoms that are not contained in the name (and indeed if you take the name literally you would end up with entirely the wrong idea.) Likewise for "Bipolar Disorder" and "Depression".
These are names for groups of symptoms which tend to go together and saying that someone has "Depression" tells you several different things about them - e.g. that they have low mood, certain kinds of sleep disturbance and appetite disturbance, etc. In fact not everyone shows all of these all the time, but most people show most of them.
The point is that to diagnose someone with, say, schizophrenia, on the basis that, say, they believe an alien is controlling their thoughts through a radio in their head, is to assert something about them; it might be a correct diagnosis, or it might be wrong e.g. they could in fact be bipolar, or it could be a culturally based belief, or they might even be right.
But if you "diagnose" someone with HSDD, you cannot be wrong - assuming they have told you that they have low sexual desire, which is the only possible reason you would make that "diagnosis". HSDD is just a re-description of their complaint. Yet it also smuggles in the implication that behind the complaint is a medical problem which could be treated with drugs.
Now maybe that's right. Maybe it isn't. We just don't know. It doesn't appear to be treatable with flibanserin. But then, maybe that's because it's not a medical issue at all in most cases.
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Commercialization vs. Medicalization
09.00
wsn
Suppose there was someone who's perfectly healthy, just stressed, or worried, or or unhappy.
And suppose that, for whatever reason, they go see their doctor about their problems, they get a diagnosis of depression, or social anxiety disorder, or something, and a prescription for Prozac.
What's wrong with this picture? Well, it's a clear case of medicalization: because I made it up to be a good example of medicalization. But what's wrong with medicalization? The medicines themselves? Many people think so, but if you ask me, they're the least troublesome part of the process.
Drugs cost money, but not much: generic fluoxetine, i.e. non-brand-name Prozac, currently costs less than 10 cents per day. Drugs have side effects, but if our hypothetical person doesn't like the Prozac he or she's been prescribed, there's nothing stopping them from chucking it in the bin.
A diagnosis, on the other hand, is a lot harder to shake. In theory, one could get a second opinion from a different doctor and be declared perfectly healthy but in all my conversations with psychiatrists and patients I've never known of someone with a mental health diagnosis getting "undiagnosed" completely.
What's harmful about a mental health diagnosis? It changes the way you think about yourself, in many complicated ways. Just for one thing, it's likely to make you reconsider your past actions and ask if they were "really you", or whether they were caused by your illness.
Now, if you really are mentally ill, that is, if the diagnosis is accurate, this change will probably be a good thing; it might help you realize that with help, you can change, and avoid making the same mistakes you blame yourself for, for example. But if you're not ill, the same changes might be harmful.
A diagnosis invites you to think about problems through the lens of objective, impersonal analysis and treatment, what we might call the "clinical approach". The clinical approach is obviously the best one for most physical diseases. If you have cholera, you are ill, and you need to be diagnosed, and treated appropriately. Most people would agree that the clinical approach is also useful, albeit more problematic, in clear cut mental illnesses like schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and (some cases of) depression.
But if your problem, or the root of your problems, is not that you're ill but that you're poor, or a victim of discrimination, or in the wrong job, or the wrong relationship, or you don't have either, etc. then a diagnosis is both futile, and quite possibly, actively harmful.
Futile because there's no disease to treat, and harmful because by situating that the origins of your problems are inside yourself (your neurochemistry, a "chemical imbalance"), it diverts attention from the real issues and the real solutions. Maybe you just need to change your situation, take a decision, get a new perspective, stop doing something.
Is there an answer? Many people want us to stop taking so many antidepressants: reverse the trend of medicalization, by reducing the number of pills we take. But there may be another way: commercialization.
Suppose that you didn't need a prescription to get Prozac: you just bought SSRIs over the counter, like aspirin, whenever you felt like it. What would this mean? It might mean more people taking Prozac, although I'm not sure it would. But it would almost certainly change the way people think about antidepressants.
Commercializing SSRIs would, I think, mean that many SSRI users stopped seeing themselves as "psychiatric patients", or as the pills as cures for their "illnesses". Instead they'd see them more like aspirin, or coffee, or beer: something to help you "feel better", a nice thing to have in some circumstances, but not something that's going to solve all your problems. It would, in other words, prevent mentally healthy people from thinking of themselves as "mentally ill". With any luck, our hypothetical friend from the first paragraph would be one of them.
You can easily take this argument too far, and if you do, you'll eventually arrive approximately here. Don't. Serious clinical depression and anxiety disorders are real, and people who suffer from them often need "prescription-strength" drugs, and more importantly, professional help rather than being left to self-treat, because the ability to take care of yourself is, almost by definition, impaired in mental illness.
But these people might benefit from the commercialization of mood as well. They'd no longer be seen as qualitatively different from everyone else, weird and unusual. It's like how if someone's got severe pain, and needs prescription-strength painkillers, that's no big deal, because hey, we've all taken aspirin for headaches.
Commercialization would be better than medicalization for other drugs too. Take flibanserin, the new drug for "Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder", a condition which, according to the drug company who make flibanserin, affects maybe 20% of women.
Whether flibanserin really boosts libido to any significant extent is unclear, but let's assume it does. Why not sell it over-the-counter? Give it a raunchy name, put it in a colorful box, and sell it in pharmacies next to the condoms. I can picture it now...
Now that would be pretty ridiculous. It would be a crass example of the commercialization of sexuality. But flibanserin already is - or at least, saying 20% of women ought to be taking it is. By selling it as a lifestyle product, instead of a medical treatment, its crassness would be obvious, and we'd just have lots of people taking flibanserin, instead of lots of people taking flibanserin and thinking of themselves as suffering from "Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder" i.e. a mental illness.Unfortunately, I rather doubt that this is going to happen any time soon, although if you go to many "3rd world" countries, you'll find antidepressants, and indeed most other drugs, on the pharmacy shelves for anyone to buy without a prescription. To Westerners, this might seem primitive. I'm not so sure.
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Attitudes to Mental Illness
12.20
wsn
Ever wondered what the British public think about mental illness?
Well, the British government has, and the results of the 2010 Attitudes to Mental Illness Survey are out. I'm never sure how much faith to put in such data because what people are willing to say they think, and what they really feel, are not the same.
So while it's encouraging that only 20% of people say they agree with the statement that "Anyone with a history of mental illness should be excluded from taking public office", it would be naive to think that the other 80% would really be equally likely to vote for someone with a psychiatric history when push came to shove. We've moved on since McGovern, but maybe not all that much.
Worse, a lot of the questions are dubious. One asks whether you agree that "Mental hospitals are an outdated means of treating people with mental illness", the 'right' answer, that gets counted as a nice positive attitude, being to agree. I disagree, not least because inpatient treatment for depression helped my grandfather hugely when he was a young man. If that means I have a bad attitude to the mentally ill, so be it. I don't think it does.
Another item asks "What proportion of people in the UK do you think might have a mental health problem at some point in their lives?" The approved answer, as Neuroskeptic readers may have guessed, was 1 in 4. But only 16% of the British public picked that option from the multiple-choice quiz. Most thought it was much lower:
How silly of them...or maybe not. There has in fact never been a study of the lifetime prevalence of mental illness in Britain. Studies in other English-speaking countries, such as the US and New Zealand, have repeatedly shown lifetime prevalence rates of 50%, or higher, for mental illness according to DSM-IV criteria. But these figures and these criteria have been credibly accused of overstating the proportion of people with a genuine psychiatric illness, maybe greatly so. There's a lot to say on both sides of this debate, but the point is that the question is open. Expecting the public to know the answer, when the experts don't, is rather unfair.However, interestingly enough, this very survey asked whether respondents had ever suffered mental illness themselves. How many had? There's a 4 in it, but it's not 1 in 4, it's 4%.
I strongly suspect this is an underestimate. Some people are ill and don't know it or don't admit it. People with mental illness might be less likely to participate in the study. There'll be people will get ill at some point in their lives after they fill in the survey. And the format of the question was a bit odd (see page 64 and see what you make of it). But still, this is another point of data for the great prevalence debate.
The proportion of people with mental illness ultimately depends on how you define "mental illness". I don't think anyone has an entirely satisfactory definition, so any attempt to pin down the lifetime prevalence is problematic until we sort that out, but if I had to put it a number on it, it would be about 1 in 10 in Western countries.
I'm no expert on this topic so take this with a big pinch of salt. Still, I'd find it very hard to accept a figure much lower than this, from personal experience if nothing else. I'd be open to the idea that the true figure is much higher, but this would mean that tens of millions of British people are going around getting mentally ill and never receiving treatment, and it would take some very strong evidence to convince me of that.
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That Sinking Feeling?
15.40
wsn
Sinking and Swimming is a paper just out from the Young Foundation, a British think-tank. It "explores how psychological and material needs are being met and unmet in Britain." I'm not sure how useful their broad concept of "unmet needs" is, but there's some rather interesting data in this report.
On page 238, and prominently in the executive summary, we find the following terrifying graph, which comes with warnings like "anxiety and depression looks set to double during the course of a single generation..." The % of the population self-reporting suffering from depression or anxiety seems to have been consistently rising since 1990, from less than 6% to almost 10% today. And the line continues ever upwards. Eeek!
Is Britain really becoming more depressed and anxious? No, and that's what makes this graph terrifying. According to the large government Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey, the prevalence of self-reported depression and anxiety symptoms rose slightly from 1993 to 2000 (15.5% to 17.5%) and then stayed level up to 2007 (17.6%). Not very scary. Even the Young Foundation note (on page 80) that when you look at "well-being"
analysis of the English health survey that uses a variation of GHQ [General Health Questionnaire] suggested that the proportion of the working age population with poor psychological well-being decreased from 17% in 1997 to 13% in 2006.On that measure, we're getting happier. And the rate of new diagnoses of clinical depression fell over the past decade.
So what about that ominous line? Well, that graph was based on "self-reported anxiety or depression", but in a specific sense. People were not reporting feeling scared or unhappy (see above for the data on that), but rather, reporting having anxiety or depression as medical disorders. Curiously the % of people reporting having every other sort of health problems (except with vision) increased from 1991 to 2007 as well:
What seems to be happening is that British people are becoming more willing to label our problems as medical illnesses, although in fact our mental health has not changed much over the past two decades, and may even have improved slightly. This is what's terrifying, because medicalizing emotional issues is a bad idea.Mental illness does exist, and medicine can help treat it, but medicine can't resolve non-medical problems even if they're labelled as illnesses. Antidepressants, for example, are (imperfectly) effective for severe clinical depression but probably not for "mild depression"; much of what is labelled "mild depression" is probably not, in any meaningful sense, an illness.
Why does this matter? Drugs have side effects, and psychotherapy is expensive. The cost-benefit profile of any treatment is obviously negative when there are no benefits because the treatment is being used inappropriately. My biggest concern, though, is that if someone is unhappy because of tensions in their marriage or because they're in the wrong job, they don't need treatment, they need to do something about it. Labelling a problem as an illness and treating it medically may, in itself, make that problem harder to overcome.
[BPSDB]
Posted in
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The Politics of Psychopharmacology
15.59
wsn
It's always nice when a local boy makes good in the big wide world. Many British neuroscientists and psychiatrists have been feeling rather proud this week following the enormous amount of attention given to Professor David Nutt, formerly the British government's chief adviser on illegal drugs.
Formerly being the key word. Nutt was sacked (...write your own "nutsack" pun if you must) last Friday, prompting a remarkable amount of condemnation. Critics included the rest of his former organisation, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD), and the Government's Science Minister. The UK's Chief Scientist also spoke in favour of Nutt's views. Journalists joined in the fun with headlines like "politicians are intoxicated by cowardice".
"The sacking of a government adviser on drugs shows Britain's politicians can't cope with intelligent debate... the position of the Labour government and of the leading opposition party, the Conservatives, which vigorously supported Nutt's sacking, has no merit at all. It deals a significant blow both to the chances of an informed and reasoned debate over illegal drugs, and to the parties' own scientific credibility."They also have an interview with the man himself.
What happened? The short answer is a lecture Nutt gave on the 10th October, Estimating Drug Harms: A Risky Business? I'd recommend reading it (it's free). The Government's dismissal e-mail gave two reasons why he had to go - firstly, "Your recent comments have gone beyond [matters of evidence] and have been lobbying for a change of government policy" and secondly, "It is important that the government's messages on drugs are clear and as an advisor you do nothing to undermine public understanding of them."
Many people believe that Nutt was fired because he argued for the liberalization of drug laws, or because he claimed that the harms of some illegal drugs, such as cannabis, are less severe than those of legal substances like tobacco and alcohol. On this view, the government's actions were "shooting the messenger", or dismissing an expert because they didn't like to hear to the facts. It seems to me, however, that the truth is a little more nuanced, and even more stupid.
Nutt's lecture, if you read the whole thing as opposed to the quotes in the media, is remarkably mild. For instance, at no point does he suggest that any drug which is currently illegal should be made legal. The changes he "lobbies for" are ones that the ACMD have already recommended, and this lobbying consists of nothing more than tentative criticism of the stated reasons for the rejection of the ACMD's advice. The ACMD is government's official expert body on illicit drugs, remember.
The issue Nutt focusses on is the question of whether cannabis should be a "Class C" or a "Class B" illegal drug, B being "worse", and carrying stricter penalties. It was Class B until 2004, when it was made Class C. In 2007, the Government asked the ACMD to advise on whether it should be re-reclassified back up to Class B. This was in response to concerns about the impact of cannabis on mental health, specifically the possibility that it raises the risk of psychotic illnesses.
The resulting ACMD report is available on the Government's website. They concluded that while cannabis use is certainly not harmless, "the harms caused by cannabis are not considered to be as serious as drugs in class B and therefore it should remain a class C drug."
Despite this, the Government took the decision to reclassify cannabis as Class B. In his lecture Nutt criticizes this decision - slightly. Nutt quotes the Home Secretary as saying, in response to the ACMD's report -
"Where there is a clear and serious problem [i.e. cannabis health problems], but doubt about the potential harm that will be caused, we must err on the side of caution and protect the public. I make no apology for that. I am not prepared to wait and see."Nutt describes this reasoning as -
"the precautionary principle - if you’re not sure about a drug harm, rank it high... at first sight it might seem the obvious decision – why wouldn’t you take the precautionary principle? We know that drugs are harmful and that you can never evaluate a drug over the lifetime of a whole population, so we can never know whether, at some point in the future, a drug might lead to or cause more harm than it did early in its use."But he says, there's more to it than this. Firstly, we don't know anything about how classification affects drug use. The whole idea of upgrading cannabis to Class B to protect the public relies on the assumption that it will reduce drug use by deterring people from using it. But there is no empirical evidence as to whether this actually happens. As Nutt points out, stricter classification might equally well increase use by making it seem forbidden, and hence, cooler. (If you think that's implausible, you have forgotten what it is like to be 16.) We just don't know.
Second, he says, the precautionary principle devalues the evidence and is thereby self-defeating because it means that people will not take any warnings about drug harms seriously - "[it] leads to a position where people really don’t know what the evidence is. They see the classification, they hear about evidence and they get mixed messages. There’s quite a lot of anecdotal evidence that public confidence in the scientific probity of government has been undermined in this kind of way." Can anyone really dispute this?
Finally, he raises the MMR vaccine scare as an example of the precautionary principle ironically leading to concrete harms. Concerns were raised about the safety of a vaccine, on the basis of dubious science. As a result, vaccine coverage fell, and the incidence of measles, mumps and rubella in Britain rose for the first time in decades. The vaccine harmed no-one; these diseases do. We just don't know whether cannabis reclassification will have similar unintended consequences.
That's what the Home Secretary described as "lobbying for a change of government policy". I wish all lobbyists were this reasonable.
The Home Secretary's second charge against Nutt - "It is important that the government's messages on drugs are clear..." - is even more specious. Nutt's messages were the ACMD's messages, and as he points out, the only lack of clarity comes from the fact that the government and their own Advisory Council disagree with each other. This is hardly the ACMD's fault, and it's certainly not Nutt's fault for pointing it out.
All of this is doubly ridiculous because of one easily-forgotten fact - cannabis was downgraded from Class B to Class C in 2004 by the present Labour Party government. Nutt's "lobbying" therefore consists of a recommendation that the government do something they themselves previously did. And if the government are worried about the clarity of their message, the fact that they themselves were saying that cannabis was benign enough to be a Class C drug just 5 years ago might be somewhat relevant.
The manuscript falls short of its goals in several respects: The basic phenomenon ... is barely presented... The style and language of the review leave a lot to be desired... The citations and reference list are appalling.The same reviewer also criticized the basic argument of my article, implicitly branding the whole paper - all 10,000 words of it, which took dozens of hours to write - a complete waste of time.
Ouch. But as an academic, giving, and receiving, this kind of treatment is all part of the job, and that's just as it should be. I'm confident that my argument is sound, so I'm going to take the criticisms on board, rewrite the paper appropriately, and submit it to another journal. What I'm not going to do is bear a grudge against the reviewer. (Well maybe a little: the references weren't that bad.) To be fair, unlike Nutt's, this review was not made in the public domain, but then, I'm not a Government elected by the public.
Nutt's mistake was to think that it's possible to have a serious debate about a serious political issue. In fact, it was probably not such a bad mistake, since the job of the ACMD, as the Government sees it, is a fairly pointless one: their job is to give expert advice and then let it be ignored. As various ACMD members have noted, they work for free, in the public interest. If I were on the Committee, I would resign now, not just out of sympathy for Nutt, but because it's a crap job.
In his dismissal letter, the Home Secretary told Nutt, "It is not the job of the Chair of the Government's advisory Council to initiate a public debate on the policy framework for drugs". I would have thought he was exactly the person who should do this if such a debate was necessary, as it obviously is. Well, now we know better. It wasn't his job. Although, thanks to the government who sacked him, a drug debate is now going on in the British media for the first time in years. In the long run, Nutt's most important action as Chair of the ACMD may well have been getting sacked from it.
[BPSDB]
Daniel Cressey (2009). Sacked science adviser speaks out Nature

