More on Medical Marijuana

Previously I wrote about a small study finding that smoked marijuana helps with HIV-related pain. In the last month, two more clinical trials of medical marijuana - or rather, marijuana-based drugs - for pain have come out.

First, the good news. Johnson et al tested a mouth spray containing the two major psychoactive chemicals in marijuana, THC and CBD. Their patients were all suffering from terminal cancer, which believe it or not, is quite painful. Almost all of the subjects were already taking high doses of strong opiate painkillers: a mean of 270 mg morphine or equivalent each day, which is enough to kill someone without a tolerance. (A couple of them were on an eye-watering 6 grams daily). Yet they were still in pain.

Patients were allowed to use the cannabinoid spray as often as they wanted for 2 weeks. Lo and behold, the THC/CBD spray was more effective than an inactive placebo spray at relieving pain. The effect was modest, but statistically significant, and given what these people were going through I'm sure they were glad of even "modest" effects. A third group got a spray containing only THC, and this was less effective than the combined THC/CBD - on most measures, it was no better than placebo. THC is often thought of as the single "active ingredient" in marijuana, but this suggests that there's more to it than that. This was a relatively large study - 177 patients in total - so the results are pretty convincing, although you should know that it was funded and sponsored by GW Pharma, whose "vision is to the global leader in prescription cannabinoid medicines". Hmm.


The other trial was less promising, although it was in a completely different group - patients with painful diabetic neuropathy. The people in this study were in pain despite taking tricyclic antidepressants, which, curiously, are quite good at relieving neuropathic pain. Again, the treatment was a combined CBD/THC spray, and this trial for lasted 12 weeks. The active spray was no more effective than the placebo spray this time around - both groups improved a lot. This was a small trial (just 29 patients), so it might just have not been big enough to detect any effect. Also, this one wasn't funded by a pharmaceutical company.

Overall, this is further evidence that marijuana-based drugs can treat some kinds of pain, although maybe not all of them. I have to say, though, that I'm not sure that we needed a placebo-controlled trial to tell us that terminal cancer patients can benefit from medical marijuana. If someone's dying from cancer, I say let them use whatever the hell they want, if they find it helps them. Dying patients used to be given something called a Brompton cocktail, a mixture of drugs that would make Keith Richards jealous:  heroin, cocaine, marijuana, chloroform, and gin, in the most popular variant.

And why not? There were no placebo-controlled trials proving that it worked, but it seemed to help, and even if it was just a placebo (which seems unlikely), placebo pain relief is still pain relief. I'm not saying that these kinds of trials aren't valuable, but I don't think we should demand cast-iron proof that medical marijuana works before making it available to people who are suffering. People are suffering now, and trials take time.

ResearchBlogging.org

Johnson JR, Burnell-Nugent M, Lossignol D, Ganae-Motan ED, Potts R, & Fallon MT (2009). Multicenter, Double-Blind, Randomized, Placebo-Controlled, Parallel-Group Study of the Efficacy, Safety, and Tolerability of THC:CBD Extract and THC Extract in Patients With Intractable Cancer-Related Pain. Journal of pain and symptom management PMID: 19896326

Selvarajah D, Gandhi R, Emery CJ, & Tesfaye S (2009). A Randomised Placebo Controlled Double Blind Clinical Trial of Cannabis Based Medicinal Product (Sativex) in Painful Diabetic Neuropathy: Depression is a Major Confounding Factor. Diabetes care PMID: 19808912

Book: Deep Brain Stimulation

Jamie Talan's Deep Brain Stimulation: A New Treatment Shows Promise In The Most Difficult Cases is the first book to offer a popular look at DBS, one of the more exciting emerging treatments in neurology and psychiatry.

Deep Brain Stimulation is not a textbook and the depth of scientific detail is kept pretty low, but the breadth of the material is good. Talan reviews the many kinds of disorders for which DBS has been trialled, from the early 1990s when it was used in Parkinson's disease up to the past five years where it's been tried for everything from epilepsy, depression and Tourette's Syndrome up to lifting patients out of persistent vegetative states (maybe).

Unfortunately, Talan doesn't discuss the controversial history of the first era of human brain stimulation, including the morally murky work of Robert G. Heath at Tulane University in the 1960s. She mentions Tulane once in passing but more detail would have been welcome, if only because it's a rather spicy tale.

The book's most engaging passages are the stories of individual patients. There's the man with Parkinson's who experienced amazing benefits from DBS, and who was so keen to keep them that he didn't tell doctors about the infection which developed a few weeks after surgery, in case they took the electrode out. After literally keeping the infected site under his hat for a few days, it progressed to a brain abscess, and he nearly died. Happily, he not only survived but was able to get the electrodes reimplanted.

Then there's the most moving case, that of the woman suffering from severe OCD and depression, who was given experimental DBS for the former condition. She died by suicide several months later, but said in her suicide note that the DBS had worked - her OCD symptoms were gone. Her depression was as bad as ever, though, and this is what led her to suicide. She wanted people to know that deep brain stimulation helped her, and didn't want her death to go down in the records as a mark against it.

The precursor to DBS was ablative neurosurgery - destroying particular parts of the brain in order to relieve symptoms. Talan describes its use in movement disorders such as Parkinson's, but she glosses over the history of "psychosurgery", the use of surgery to treat mental illness. People using DBS in psychiatry often prefer not to talk about psychosurgery - it's not exactly good PR. But clearly it is relevant. For all its faults, psychosurgery did seem to help some patients, which is why it's still used today in rare cases, although DBS may soon replace it.

DBS for depression and OCD usually target the same prefrontal white matter pathways that psychosurgery severed, so scientifically, psychosurgery has lessons for DBS. The ethical issues overlap too. Although DBS is reversible, unlike brain lesioning, it carries the same risks of serious complications like infection or brain bleeding. And there's the same question of whether seriously mentally ill people can give informed consent.

The book's strongest chaper is the last, which covers the ethical and practical difficulties of DBS. The danger is that enthusiastic doctors with no experience of the procedure, encouraged by the tales from other hospitals, might start doing it inappropriately. There's also a risk that patients or their families might volunteer for DBS prematurely or have impossibly high expectations. The initial results have been very promising, but there have been no large placebo-controlled trials so far (except in some movement disorders). And even with the best surgeons, in most disorders the response rate seems to hover around the 50-60% mark. Talan warns that DBS risks being a victim of its own hype. That's an important message.

The Needle and the Damage (Not) Done

You may already have heard about Desiree Jennings.


If not, here's a summary, although for the full story you should consult Steven Novella or Orac, whose expert analyses of the case are second to none. Desiree Jennings is a 25 year old woman from Ashburn, Virginia who developed horrible symptoms following a seasonal flu vaccination in August. As she puts it:
In a matter of a few short weeks I lost the ability to walk, talk normally, and focus on more than one stimuli at a time. Whenever I eat I know, without fail, that my body will soon go into uncontrollable convulsions coupled with periods of blacking out.
For some weeks the problems were so bad that she was almost completely disabled, and feared the damage was permanent. Vaccines had destroyed her life. You can see a video here - American TV has covered the story in a lot of detail (the fact that she is quite... photogenic can't have put them off). Desiree and the media described her illness as dystonia, a neurological condition characterised by uncontrollable muscle contractions. Dystonia is caused by damage to certain motor pathways in the brain.

However, Desiree Jennings does not have dystonia. The symptoms look a bit like dystonia to the untrained eye, but they're not it. This is the unanimous opinion of dystonia experts who've seen the footage of Jennings. A blogger discovered that it was also seemingly the view of the neurologist who originally examined her.

So what's wrong with her? The answer, according to experts, is that her symptoms are psychogenic - "neurological" or "medical" symptoms caused by psychological factors rather than organic brain damage. It's important to be clear on what exactly this implies. It doesn't mean that Jennings is "making up" or "faking" the symptoms or that they're a "hoax". The symptoms are as "real" as any others, the only thing psychological about them is the cause. Nor are psychogenic symptoms delusions - Jennings isn't mentally ill or "crazy".

Almost certainly, she is in her right mind, and she sincerely believes that she is a victim of brain damage caused by the flu shot. The belief is false, but it's not crazy - in 1976 one flu vaccine may have caused neurological disorders and today many, many otherwise sane people believe that vaccines cause all kinds of damage. (It could well be that this belief is actually driving Jennings' symptoms, but we can't know that - there could be other psychological factors at work.)

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One of the hallmarks of psychogenic symptoms is that they improve in response to psychological factors. Neurologist blogger Steven Novella predicted that:
I predict that they will be able to “cure” her, because psychogenic disorders can and do spontaneously resolve. They will then claim victory for their quackery in curing a (non-existent) vaccine injury.
They being anti-vaccination group Generation Rescue who were swift to offer Jennings their support and, er, expertise. And this is exactly what seems to be happening: Dr Rashid Buttar, a prominent anti-vaccine doctor who treats "vaccine damage" cases, began giving Jennings (amongst other things) chelation therapy to flush out toxic metals from her body, on the theory that her dystonia was caused by mercury in the vaccine. It worked! Dr. Buttar tells us - 15 minutes after the chelation solution started entering her body through an IV drip, all of the symptoms had disappeared (on the podcast it's about 6:00 onwards).

It's completely implausible that mercury in the vaccine could have caused dystonia, and even if it somehow did, it's impossible that chelation could reverse mercury-induced brain damage so quickly. If you are unfortunate enough to get mercury poisoning the neurological damage is permanent; flushing out the mercury wouldn't cure you. There's now no question that Jennings is a textbook case of psychogenic illness.

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On this blog I've often written about the mysterious "placebo effect". A few weeks ago, I said -
People seem more willing to accept the mind-over-matter powers of "the placebo" than they are to accept the existence of psychosomatic illness.
We certainly seem to talk about placebos more than we talk about psychosomatic or psychogenic illness. There are 20 million Google hits for "placebo", just 1.6 million for "psychosomatic", and 500,000 for "psychogenic". (Even "placebo -music -trial" gives 8.7 million, which excludes all of the many placebo-controlled clinical trials and also hits about the band.)

Why? One important factor is surely that it's very difficult to prove that any given illness is "psychosomatic". Even if a patient has symptoms with no apparent medical cause, leading to suspicions that they're psychogenic, there could always be an organic cause waiting to be discovered. Just as we can never prove that there were no WMDs in Iraq, we can never prove that a given illness is purely psychological in origin.

But occasionally, there are cases where the psychogenic nature of an illness is so patent that there can be little doubt, and this is one of them. Watch the videos, listen to the account of the cure, and marvel at the mysteries of the mind.

[BPSDB]

The Politics of Psychopharmacology

It's always nice when a local boy makes good in the big wide world. Many British neuroscientists and psychiatrists have been feeling rather proud this week following the enormous amount of attention given to Professor David Nutt, formerly the British government's chief adviser on illegal drugs.

Formerly being the key word. Nutt was sacked (...write your own "nutsack" pun if you must) last Friday, prompting a remarkable amount of condemnation. Critics included the rest of his former organisation, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD), and the Government's Science Minister. The UK's Chief Scientist also spoke in favour of Nutt's views. Journalists joined in the fun with headlines like "politicians are intoxicated by cowardice".

Even Nature today ran a bluntly-worded editorial -

"The sacking of a government adviser on drugs shows Britain's politicians can't cope with intelligent debate... the position of the Labour government and of the leading opposition party, the Conservatives, which vigorously supported Nutt's sacking, has no merit at all. It deals a significant blow both to the chances of an informed and reasoned debate over illegal drugs, and to the parties' own scientific credibility."
They also have an interview with the man himself.

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What happened? The short answer is a lecture Nutt gave on the 10th October, Estimating Drug Harms: A Risky Business? I'd recommend reading it (it's free). The Government's dismissal e-mail gave two reasons why he had to go - firstly, "Your recent comments have gone beyond [matters of evidence] and have been lobbying for a change of government policy" and secondly, "It is important that the government's messages on drugs are clear and as an advisor you do nothing to undermine public understanding of them."

Many people believe that Nutt was fired because he argued for the liberalization of drug laws, or because he claimed that the harms of some illegal drugs, such as cannabis, are less severe than those of legal substances like tobacco and alcohol. On this view, the government's actions were "shooting the messenger", or dismissing an expert because they didn't like to hear to the facts. It seems to me, however, that the truth is a little more nuanced, and even more stupid.


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Nutt's lecture, if you read the whole thing as opposed to the quotes in the media, is remarkably mild. For instance, at no point does he suggest that any drug which is currently illegal should be made legal. The changes he "lobbies for" are ones that the ACMD have already recommended, and this lobbying consists of nothing more than tentative criticism of the stated reasons for the rejection of the ACMD's advice. The ACMD is government's official expert body on illicit drugs, remember.

The issue Nutt focusses on is the question of whether cannabis should be a "Class C" or a "Class B" illegal drug, B being "worse", and carrying stricter penalties. It was Class B until 2004, when it was made Class C. In 2007, the Government asked the ACMD to advise on whether it should be re-reclassified back up to Class B. This was in response to concerns about the impact of cannabis on mental health, specifically the possibility that it raises the risk of psychotic illnesses.

The resulting ACMD report is available on the Government's website. They concluded that while cannabis use is certainly not harmless, "the harms caused by cannabis are not considered to be as serious as drugs in class B and therefore it should remain a class C drug."

Despite this, the Government took the decision to reclassify cannabis as Class B. In his lecture Nutt criticizes this decision - slightly. Nutt quotes the Home Secretary as saying, in response to the ACMD's report -
"Where there is a clear and serious problem [i.e. cannabis health problems], but doubt about the potential harm that will be caused, we must err on the side of caution and protect the public. I make no apology for that. I am not prepared to wait and see."
Nutt describes this reasoning as -

"the precautionary principle - if you’re not sure about a drug harm, rank it high... at first sight it might seem the obvious decision – why wouldn’t you take the precautionary principle? We know that drugs are harmful and that you can never evaluate a drug over the lifetime of a whole population, so we can never know whether, at some point in the future, a drug might lead to or cause more harm than it did early in its use."
But he says, there's more to it than this. Firstly, we don't know anything about how classification affects drug use. The whole idea of upgrading cannabis to Class B to protect the public relies on the assumption that it will reduce drug use by deterring people from using it. But there is no empirical evidence as to whether this actually happens. As Nutt points out, stricter classification might equally well increase use by making it seem forbidden, and hence, cooler. (If you think that's implausible, you have forgotten what it is like to be 16.) We just don't know.

Second, he says, the precautionary principle devalues the evidence and is thereby self-defeating because it means that people will not take any warnings about drug harms seriously - "[it] leads to a position where people really don’t know what the evidence is. They see the classification, they hear about evidence and they get mixed messages. There’s quite a lot of anecdotal evidence that public confidence in the scientific probity of government has been undermined in this kind of way." Can anyone really dispute this?

Finally, he raises the MMR vaccine scare as an example of the precautionary principle ironically leading to concrete harms. Concerns were raised about the safety of a vaccine, on the basis of dubious science. As a result, vaccine coverage fell, and the incidence of measles, mumps and rubella in Britain rose for the first time in decades. The vaccine harmed no-one; these diseases do. We just don't know whether cannabis reclassification will have similar unintended consequences.

That's what the Home Secretary described as "lobbying for a change of government policy". I wish all lobbyists were this reasonable.

The Home Secretary's second charge against Nutt - "It is important that the government's messages on drugs are clear..." - is even more specious. Nutt's messages were the ACMD's messages, and as he points out, the only lack of clarity comes from the fact that the government and their own Advisory Council disagree with each other. This is hardly the ACMD's fault, and it's certainly not Nutt's fault for pointing it out.

All of this is doubly ridiculous because of one easily-forgotten fact - cannabis was downgraded from Class B to Class C in 2004 by the present Labour Party government. Nutt's "lobbying" therefore consists of a recommendation that the government do something they themselves previously did. And if the government are worried about the clarity of their message, the fact that they themselves were saying that cannabis was benign enough to be a Class C drug just 5 years ago might be somewhat relevant.

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Nutt has said that he was surprised to learn that he had been sacked. I'm sure this surprise was genuine because Nutt is an academic, and in academia, Nutt's "criticisms" would hardly even be considered as such. Here by contrast is an extract from a peer review comment I got a couple of days ago regarding a scientific paper I wrote:
The manuscript falls short of its goals in several respects: The basic phenomenon ... is barely presented... The style and language of the review leave a lot to be desired... The citations and reference list are appalling.
The same reviewer also criticized the basic argument of my article, implicitly branding the whole paper - all 10,000 words of it, which took dozens of hours to write - a complete waste of time.

Ouch. But as an academic, giving, and receiving, this kind of treatment is all part of the job, and that's just as it should be. I'm confident that my argument is sound, so I'm going to take the criticisms on board, rewrite the paper appropriately, and submit it to another journal. What I'm not going to do is bear a grudge against the reviewer. (Well maybe a little: the references weren't that bad.) To be fair, unlike Nutt's, this review was not made in the public domain, but then, I'm not a Government elected by the public.

Nutt's mistake was to think that it's possible to have a serious debate about a serious political issue. In fact, it was probably not such a bad mistake, since the job of the ACMD, as the Government sees it, is a fairly pointless one: their job is to give expert advice and then let it be ignored. As various ACMD members have noted, they work for free, in the public interest. If I were on the Committee, I would resign now, not just out of sympathy for Nutt, but because it's a crap job.

In his dismissal letter, the Home Secretary told Nutt, "It is not the job of the Chair of the Government's advisory Council to initiate a public debate on the policy framework for drugs". I would have thought he was exactly the person who should do this if such a debate was necessary, as it obviously is. Well, now we know better. It wasn't his job. Although, thanks to the government who sacked him, a drug debate is now going on in the British media for the first time in years. In the long run, Nutt's most important action as Chair of the ACMD may well have been getting sacked from it.

[BPSDB]

ResearchBlogging.orgNature (2009). A drug-induced low Nature, 462 (7269), 11-12 DOI: 10.1038/462011b

Daniel Cressey (2009). Sacked science adviser speaks out Nature

Real vs Placebo Coffee

Coffee contains caffeine, and as everyone knows, caffeine is a stimulant. We all know how a good cup of coffee wakes you up, makes you more alert, and helps you concentrate - thanks to caffeine.


Or does it? Are the benefits of coffee really due to the caffeine, or are there placebo effects at work? Numerous experiments have tried to answer this question, but a paper published today goes into more detail than most. (It caught my eye just as I was taking my first sip this morning, so I had to blog about it.)

The authors took 60 coffee-loving volunteers and gave them either placebo decaffeinated coffee, or coffee containing 280 mg caffeine. That's quite a lot, roughly equivalent to three normal cups. 30 minutes later, they attempted a difficult button-pressing task requiring concentration and sustained effort, plus a task involving mashing buttons as fast as possible for a minute.

The catch was that the experimenters lied to the volunteers. Everyone was told that they were getting real coffee. Half of them were told that the coffee would enhance their performance on the tasks, while the other half were told it would impair it. If the placebo effect was at work, these misleading instructions should have affected how the volunteers felt and acted.

Several interesting things happened. First, the caffeine enhanced performance on the cognitive tasks - it wasn't just a placebo effect. Bear in mind, though, that these people were all regular coffee drinkers who hadn't drunk any caffeine that day. The benefit could have been a reversal of caffeine withdrawl symptoms.

Second, there was a small effect of expectancy on task performance in the placebo group - but it worked in reverse. People who were told that the coffee would make them do worse actually did better than those who expected the coffee to help them. Presumably, this is because they put in extra effort to try to overcome the supposedly negative effects. This paradoxical placebo response reminds us that there's more to "the placebo effect" than meets the eye.

Finally, no-one who got the decaf noticed that it didn't actually contain caffeine, and the volunteer's ratings of their alertness and mood didn't differ between the caffeine and placebo groups. So, this suggests that if you were to secretly replace someone's favorite blend with decaf, they wouldn't notice - although their performance would nevertheless decline. Bear that in mind when considering pranks to play on colleagues or flatmates.

It looks like science has just confirmed another piece of The Wisdom of Seinfeld:

Elaine: Jerry likes Morning Thunder.
George: Jerry drinks Morning Thunder? Morning Thunder has caffeine in it. Jerry doesn't drink caffeine.
Elaine: Jerry doesn't know Morning Thunder has caffeine in it.
George: You don't tell him?
Elaine: No. And you should see him. Man, he gets all hyper, he doesn't even know why! He loves it. He walks around going, "God, I feel great!"
- Seinfeld, "The Dog"

[BPSDB]

ResearchBlogging.orgHarrell PT, & Juliano LM (2009). Caffeine expectancies influence the subjective and behavioral effects of caffeine. Psychopharmacology PMID: 19760283

More Antidepressant Debates

Six months ago, I asked What's The Best Antidepressant?, and I discussed a paper by Andrea Cipriani et al. The paper claimed that of the modern antidepressants, escitalopram (Lexapro) and sertraline (Zoloft) offer the best combination of effectiveness and mild side effects, and that sertraline has the advantage of being much cheaper.

The Cipriani paper was a meta-analysis of trials comparing one drug against another. With a total of over 25,000 patients, it boasted an impressively large dataset, but I advised caution. Their method of crunching the numbers (indirect comparisons) was complex, and rested on a lot of assumptions.

I wasn't the only skeptic. Cipriani et al has attracted plenty of comments in the medical literature, and they make for some fascinating reading. Indeed, they amount to crash-course in the controversies surrounding antidepressants today - a whole debate in microcosm. So here's the microcosm, in a nutshell:

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In The Lancet, the original paper was accompanied by glowing praise by one Sagar Parikh:
Free of any potential funding bias... Now, the clinician can identify the four best treatments... A new gold standard of reliable information has been compiled for patients to review.
But critical comments swiftly appeared in the Lancet's letters pages. While not accusing Cipriani and colleagues themselves of bias or conflicts-of-interest, Tom Jefferson noted that way back in 2003, David Healy drew attention to:
documents that a communications agency acting on behalf of the makers of sertraline were forced to make available by a US court. Among them was a register of completed sertraline studies awaiting to be assigned to authors. This practice (rent-a-key-opinion-leader) is of unknown prevalence but it undermines any attempt at reviewing the evidence in a meaningful way.
This is what's known as medical ghostwriting, and it is indeed a scandal. However, by itself, ghostwriting doesn't distort evidence as such. It's what's published - or not published - that counts. Almost all antidepressant trials are run and funded by drug companies. All too often, they just don't publish data showing their products in an unfavourable light. The fearsome John Ioannidis - known for writing papers with titles like Why most published research findings are false - pulled no punches in reminding readers of this, in his letter:
Among placebo controlled antidepressant trials registered with the US FDA, most negative results are unpublished or published as positive. Take sertraline, which Cipriani and colleagues recommend as the best ... of five FDA-registered trials, the only positive trial was published, one negative trial was published as positive, and three negative trials were unpublished. Head-to-head comparisons can suffer worse bias, since regulatory registration is uncommon. Meta-analysis of published plus industry-furnished data could spuriously suggest that the best drugs are those with the most shamelessly biased data ...
Ioannidis also noted that Cipriani did not include placebo-controlled trials in their analysis. He helpfully provided a table showing that if you do include these trials, the ranking of antidepressants is very different:

Of course, Ioannidis was not saying that the drug-vs-placebo data is better than the drug-vs-drug trials. After all, he had just declared it to be biased. But neither is it necessarily worse, and there's no good reason not to consider it.

Cipriani et al's response to their critics was a little light on detail. In response to concerns of industrial publication bias, they said that:
we contacted the original authors and pharmaceutical companies to obtain further data or to confirm reported figures.
But of course the pharmaceutical companies were under no obligation to play ball. They could just have chosen not to reveal embarrassing data. Rather more reassuring is the fact that the original paper did look for correlations between the drug company running each trial, and the results of the trial; they didn't find any. Rather cheekily, Cipriani et al then went on to suggest that they were the ones who were sticking it to Big Pharma:
The standard thinking has become that most antidepressants are of similar average efficacy and tolerability ... In some ways, this is a comfortable position for industry and its hired academic opinion leaders—it sets a low threshold for the introduction of new agents which can initially be marketed on the basis of small differences in specific adverse effects rather than on clear advantages in terms of overall average efficacy and acceptability.
They certainly have a point here. If aspiring antidepressants had to be proven better than existing ones in order to be sold, instead of just as good, there would probably have been no new antidepressants since Prozac in 1990. (And Prozac is only "better" than the drugs available in 1960 in that it's safer and has fewer side effects; it's no more effective.)

But this is not really relevant to whether the Cipriani analysis is valid. And in The Lancet letters, the authors did not address some of the criticisms, such as Ioannidis's point about including placebo-controlled trials, at all. They do point out that their raw data is available online for anyone to play around with.

The debate continued in the pages of Evidence Based Mental Health. In 2008, Gerald Gartlehner and Bradley Gaynes conducted a rather similar meta-analysis, but they reached very different conclusions. They declared that all post-1990 antidepressants are equally effective (or ineffective).

In their comments on the Cipriani paper, Gartlehner and Gaynes say that they were just more cautious in interpreting the results of a complex and problematic statistical process:
Ranking sertraline and escitalopram higher than other drugs conveys a precision
and existence of clinically important differences that is not reflected in the body of evidence. ...for sertraline and escitalopram the range of probabilities actually extends from the first to the eighth rank for both efficacy and acceptability... the validity of results of indirect comparisons depends on various assumptions, some of which are unverifiable ... We simply took underlying uncertainties into greater consideration and interpreted findings more cautiously than Cipriani and colleagues.
They also accuse Cipriani et al of various technical shortcomings - and in a meta-analysis, such 'technicalities' can often greatly the skew the results:
they included studies with very different populations such as frail elderly, patients with accompanying anxiety and inpatients as well as outpatients ... the effect measure of choice was odds ratios rather than relative risks. Odds ratios have mathematical advantages that statisticians value. Practitioners, however, frequently overestimate their clinical importance...
Cipriani et al respond to some of these technical criticisms, while admitting that their analysis has limitations. But, they say, even an imperfect ranking of antidepressants is better than none at all:
We have a choice. We may either make the best use of the available randomised evidence or we essentially ignore it. We believe that it is better to have a set of criteria based on the available evidence than to have no criteria at all... We believe that, despite the likely biases of the included trials, and the limitations of our approach, our analysis makes the best use of the randomised evidence, providing clinicians with evidence based criteria that can be used to guide treatment choices.
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What are we to make of all this? Here's my two cents. It's implausible that all antidepressants are truly equally effective. They affect the brain in different ways. The pharmacological differences between SSRIs such as Prozac, Zoloft and Lexapro are minimal at best but mirtazapine and reboxetine, say, target entirely different systems. They work differently, so it would be odd if they all worked equally well.

The search phrase that most often leads people to this blog is "best antidepressant". People really want to know which antidepressant is most likely to help them. In truth, everyone responds differently to every drug, so there is no one best treatment. But Cipriani et al are quite right that even a roughly correct ranking could help improve the treatment of people with depression, even if the differences are tiny. If Drug X helps 1% more people than Drug Y on average, that's a lot of people when 30 million Americans take antidepressants every year.

So, what is the best antidepressant, on average? I don't know. But maybe it's escitalopram or sertraline. Stranger things have happened.

ResearchBlogging.orgIoannidis JP (2009). Ranking antidepressants. Lancet, 373 (9677) PMID: 19465221

Gartlehner, G., & Gaynes, B. (2009). Are all antidepressants equal? Evidence-Based Mental Health, 12 (4), 98-100 DOI: 10.1136/ebmh.12.4.98

Deep Brain Stimulation for Depressed Rats

Deep-brain stimulation (DBS) is probably the most exciting emerging treatment in psychiatry. DBS is the use of high-frequency electrical current to alter the function of specific areas of the brain. Originally developed for Parkinson's disease, over the past five years DBS has been used experimentally in severe clinical depression, OCD, Tourette's syndrome, alcoholism, and more.

Reports of the effects have frequently been remarkable, but there have been few scientifically rigorous studies, and the number of psychiatric patients treated to date is just dozens. So the true usefulness of the technique is unclear. How DBS works is also a mystery. Even the most basic questions - such as whether high-frequency stimulation switches the brain "on" or "off" - are still being debated.

Recent data from rodents sheds some important light on the issue: Antidepressant-Like Effects of Medial Prefrontal Cortex Deep Brain Stimulation in Rats. The authors took rats, and implanted DBS electrodes in the infralimbic cortex. This area is part of the vmPFC. It's believed to be the rat equivalent of the human region BA25, the subgenual cingulate cortex, which is the most common target for DBS in depression. The current settings (100 microA, 130 Hz, 90 microsec) were chosen to be similar to the ones used in humans.

In a standard rat model of depression, the forced-swim test, infralimbic DBS exerted antidepressant-like effects. DBS was equally as effective as imipramine, a potent antidepressant, in terms of reducing "depression-like" behaviours, namely immobility.

This is not all that surprising. Almost everything which treats depression in humans also reduces immobility in this test (along with few things which don't treat it). Much more interesting is what did and did not block the effects of DBS in these rats.

First off, DBS worked even when the rat's infralimbic cortex had been destroyed by the toxin ibotenic acid. This strongly suggests that DBS does not work simply by activating the infralimbic cortex, even though this is where the electrodes were implanted.

Crucially, infralimbic lesions did not have an antidepressant effect per se, which also rules out the theory that DBS works by inactivating this region. (Infralimbic lesions produced by other methods did have a mild antidepressant effect, but it was smaller than the effect of DBS. This may still be important, however.)

What did block the effects of DBS was the depletion of serotonin (5HT). Serotonin is known to its friends as the brain's "happy chemical", although it's a bit more complicated than that. Most antidepressants target serotonin. And rats whose serotonin systems had been lesioned got no benefit from DBS in this study.

So this suggests that DBS might work by affecting serotonin, and indeed, DBS turned out to greatly increase serotonin release, even in a distant part of the brain (the hippocampus). Interestingly this lasted for nearly two hours after the electrodes were switched off.

Depletion of another neurotransmitter, noradrenaline, did not alter the effects of DBS.

Overall, it seems that infralimbic DBS works by increasing serotonin release, but that this is not because it activates or inactivates the infralimbic cortex itself. Rather, nearby structures must be involved. The most likely explanation is that DBS affects nearby white-matter tracts carrying signals between other areas of the brain; the infralimbic cortex might just happen to be "by the roadside". Many researchers believe that this is how DBS works in humans, but this is the first hard evidence for this.

Of course, evidence from rats is never all that hard when it comes to human mental illness. We need to know whether the same thing is true in people. As luck would have it, you can temporarily reduce human serotonin levels with a technique called acute tryptophan depletion This reverses the effects of antidepressants in many people. If this rat data is right, it should also temporarily reverse the benefits of DBS. Someone should do this experiment as soon as possible - I'd like to do it myself, but I'm British, and all the DBS research happens in America. Bah, humbug, old bean.

There's a couple of others things to note here. In other behavioural tests, infralimbic DBS also had antidepressant-like effects: it seemed to reduce anxiety, and it made rats more resistant to the stress of having electrical shocks (although only slightly.) Finally, DBS in another region, the striatum, had no antidepressant effect at all. That's a bit odd because DBS of the striatum does seem to treat depression in humans - but the part of the striatum targeted here, the caudate-putamen, is quite separate to the one targeted in human depression, the nucleus accumbens.

ResearchBlogging.orgHamani, C., Diwan, M., Macedo, C., Brandão, M., Shumake, J., Gonzalez-Lima, F., Raymond, R., Lozano, A., Fletcher, P., & Nobrega, J. (2009). Antidepressant-Like Effects of Medial Prefrontal Cortex Deep Brain Stimulation in Rats Biological Psychiatry DOI: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2009.08.025

 
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