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The Web of Morgellons

A fascinating new paper: Morgellons Disease, or Antipsychotic-Responsive Delusional Parasitosis, in an HIV Patient: Beliefs in The Age of the Internet

“Mr. A” was a 43-year-old man...His most pressing medical complaint was worrisome fatigue. He was not depressed...had no formal psychiatric history, no family psychiatric history, and he was a successful businessman.

He was referred to the psychiatry department by his primary-care physician (PCP) because of a 2-year-long complaint of pruritus [itching] accompanied by the belief of being infested with parasites. Numerous visits to the infectious disease clinic and an extensive medical work-up...had not uncovered any medical disorder, to the patient’s great frustration.

Although no parasites were ever trapped, Mr. A caused skin damage by probing for them and by applying topical solutions such as hydrogen peroxide to “bring them to the surface.” After reading about Morgellons disease on the Internet, he “recalled” extruding particles from his skin, including “dirt” and “fuzz.”

During the initial consultation visit with the psychiatrist, Mr. A was apprehensive but cautiously optimistic that a medication could help. The psychiatrist had been forewarned by the PCP that the patient had discovered a website describing Morgellons and “latched onto” this diagnosis.

However, it was notable that the patient allowed the possibility (“30%”) that he was suffering from delusions (and not Morgellons), mostly because he trusted his PCP, “who has taken very good care of me for many years.”

The patient agreed to a risperidone [an antipsychotic] trial of up to 2 mg per day. [i.e. a lowish dose]. Within weeks, his preoccupation with being infested lessened significantly... Although not 100% convinced that he might not have Morgellons disease, he is no longer pruritic and is no longer damaging his skin or trying to trap insects. He remains greatly improved 1 year later.
(Mr A. had also been HIV+ for 20 years, but he still had good immune function and the HIV may have had nothing to do with the case.)

"Morgellons" is, according to people who say they suffer from it, a mysterious disease characterised by the feeling of parasites or insects moving underneath the skin, accompanied by skin lesions out of which emerge strange, brightly-coloured fibres or threads. Other symptoms include fatigue, aches and pains, and difficulty concentrating.

According to almost all doctors, there are no parasites, the lesions are caused by the patient's own scratching or attempts to dig out the non-existent critters, and the fibres come from clothes, carpets, or other textiles which the patient has somehow inserted into their own skin. It may seem unbelievable that someone could do this "unconsciously", but stranger things have happened.

As the authors of this paper, Freudenreich et al, say, Morgellons is a disease of the internet age. It was "discovered" in 2002 by a Mary Leitao, with Patient Zero being her own 2 year old son. Since then its fame, and the reported number of cases, has grown steadily - especially in California.

Delusional parasitosis is the opposite of Morgellons: doctors believe in it, but the people who have it, don't. It's seen in some mental disorders and is also quite common in abusers of certain drugs like methamphetamine. It feels like there are bugs beneath your skin. There aren't, but the belief that there are is very powerful.

This then is the raw material in most cases; what the concept of "Morgellons" adds is a theory, a social context and a set of expectations that helps make sense of the otherwise baffling symptoms. And as we know expectations, whether positive or negative, tend to be become experiences. The diagnosis doesn't create the symptoms out of nowhere but rather takes them and reshapes them into a coherent pattern.

As Freudenreich et al note, doctors may be tempted to argue with the patient - you don't have Morgellons, there's no such thing, it's absurd - but the whole point is that mainstream medicine couldn't explain the symptoms, which is why the patient turned to less orthodox ideas.

Remember the extensive tests that came up negative "to the patient’s great frustration." And remember that "delusional parasitosis" is not an explanation, just a description, of the symptoms. To diagnose someone with that is saying "We've no idea why but you've imagined this". True, maybe, but not very palatable.

Rather, they say, doctors should just suggest that maybe there's something else going on, and should prescribe a treatment on that basis. Not rejecting the patient's beliefs but saying, maybe you're right, but in my experience this treatment makes people with your condition feel better, and that's why you're here, right?

Whether the pills worked purely as a placebo or whether there was a direct pharmacological effect, we'll never know. Probably it was a bit of both. It's not clear that it's important, really. The patient improved, and it's unlikely that it would have worked as well if they'd been given in a negative atmosphere of coercion or rejection - if indeed he'd agreed to take them at all.

Morgellons is a classic case of a disease that consists of an underlying experience filtered through the lens of a socially-transmitted interpretation. But every disease is that, to a degree. Even the most rigorously "medical" conditions like cancer also come with a set of expectations and a social meaning; psychiatric disorders certainly do.

I guess Morgellons is too new to be a textbook case yet - but it should be. Everyone with an interest in the mind, everyone who treats diseases, and everyone who's ever been ill - everyone really - ought to be familiar with it because while it's an extreme case, it's not unique. "All life is here" in those tangled little fibres.

ResearchBlogging.orgFreudenreich O, Kontos N, Tranulis C, & Cather C (2010). Morgellons disease, or antipsychotic-responsive delusional parasitosis, in an hiv patient: beliefs in the age of the internet. Psychosomatics, 51 (6), 453-7 PMID: 21051675

WMDs vs MDD

Weapons of Mass Destruction. Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. They're really nasty, right?

Well, some of them are. Nuclear weapons are Very Destructive Indeed. Even a tiny one, detonated in the middle of a major city, would probably kill hundreds of thousands. A medium-sized nuke could kill millions. The biggest would wipe a small country off the map in one go.

Chemical and biological weapons, on the other hand, while hardly nice, are just not on the same scale.

Sure, there are nightmare scenarios - a genetically engineered supervirus that kills a billion people - but they're hypothetical. If someone does design such a virus, then we can worry. As it is, biological weapons have never proven very useful. The 2001 US anthrax letters killed 5 people. Jared Loughner killed 6 with a gun he bought from a chain store.

Chemical weapons are little better. They were used heavily in WW1 and the Iran-Iraq War against military targets and killed many but never achieved a decisive victory, and the vast majority of deaths in these wars were caused by plain old bullets and bombs. Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Kurds in Halabja killed perhaps 5,000 - but this was a full-scale assault by an advanced air force, lasting several hours, on a defenceless population.

When a state-of-the-art nerve agent was used in the Tokyo subway attack, after much preparation by the cult responsible, who had professional chemists and advanced labs, 13 people died. In London on the 7th July 2005, terrorists killed 52 people with explosives made from haircare products.

Nuclear weapons aside, the best way to cause mass destruction is just to make an explosion, the bigger the better; yet conventional explosives, no matter how big, are not "WMDs", while chemical and biological weapons are.

So it seems to me that the term and the concept of "WMDs" is fundamentally unhelpful. It lumps together the apocalyptically powerful with the much less destructive. If you have to discuss everything except guns and explosives in one category, terms like "Unconventional weapons" are better as they avoid the misleading implication that all of these weapons are very, and equivalently, deadly; but grouping them together at all is risky.

That's WMDs. But there are plenty of other unhelpful concepts out there, some of which I've discussed previously. Take the concept of "major depressive disorder", for example. At least as the term is currently used, it lumps together extremely serious cases requiring hospitalization with mild "symptoms" which 40% of people experience by age 32.

Online Comments: It's Not You, It's Them

Last week I was at a discussion about New Media, and someone mentioned that they'd been put off from writing content online because of a comment on one of their articles accusing them of being "stupid".

I found this surprising - not the comment, but that anyone would take it so personally. It's the internet. You will get called names. Everyone does. It doesn't mean there's anything wrong with you.

I suspect this is a generational issue. People who 'grew up online' know, as Penny Arcade explained, that

The sad fact is that there are millions of people whose idea of fun is to find people they disagree with, and mock them. And they're right, it can be fun - why else do you think people like Jon Stewart are so popular? - but that's all it is, entertainment. If you're on the receiving end, don't take it seriously.

If you write something online, and a lot of people read it, you will get slammed. Someone, somewhere, will disagree with you and they'll tell you so, in no uncertain terms. This is true whatever you write about, but some topics are like a big red rag to the herds of bulls out there.

Just to name a few, if you say anything vaguely related to climate change, religion, health, the economy, feminism or race, you might as well be holding a placard with a big arrow pointing down at you and "Sling Mud Here" on it.

The point is - it's them, not you. They are not interested in you, they don't know you, it's not you. True, they might tailor their insults a bit; if you're a young woman you might be, say, a "stupid girl" where a man would merely get called an "idiot". But this doesn't mean that the attacks are a reflection on you in any way. You just happen to be the one in the line of fire.

What do you do about this? Nothing.

Trying to enter into a serious debate is pointless. Insulting them back can be fun, just remember that if you find it fun, you've become one of them: "he who stares too long into the abyss...", etc. Complaining to the moderators might help, but unless the site has a rock solid zero-tolerance-for-fuckwads policy, probably not. Where the blight has taken root, like Comment is Free, I'd not waste your time complaining. Just ignore it and carry on.

The most important thing is not to take it personally. Do not get offended. Do not care. Because no-one else cares. Especially the people who wrote the comments. They presumably care about whatever "issue" prompted their attack, but they don't care about you. If anything, you should be pleased, because on the internet, the only stuff that doesn't attract stupid comments is the stuff that no-one reads.

I've heard these attacks referred to as "policing" existing hierarchies or "silencing" certain types of people. This seems to me to be granting them far more respect than they deserve. With the actual police, if you break the rules, they will physically arrest you. They have power. Internet trolls don't: if they succeed in policing or silencing anybody, it's because their targets let them boss them around. They're nobody; they're not your problem.

If you can't help being offended by such comments, don't read them, but ideally you shouldn't need to resort to that. For one thing, it means you miss the sensible comments (and there's always a few). But fundamentally, you shouldn't need to do this, because you really shouldn't care what some anonymous joker from the depths of the internet thinks about you.

In Dreams

Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams is a very long book but the essential theory is very simple: dreams are thoughts. While dreaming, we are thinking about stuff, in exactly the same way as we do when awake. The difference is that the original thoughts rarely appear as such, they are transformed into weird images.

Only emotions survived unaltered. A thought about how you're angry at your boss for not giving you a raise might become a dream where you're a cop angrily chasing a bank robber, but not into one where you're a bank robber happily counting his loot. By interpreting the meaning of dreams, the psychoanalyst could work out what the patient really felt or wanted.

The problem of course is that it's easy to make up "interpretations" that follows this rule, whatever the dream. If you did dream that you were happily counting your cash after failing to get a raise, Freud could simply say that your dream was wish-fulfilment - you were dreaming of what you wanted to happen, getting the raise.

But hang on, maybe you didn't want the raise, and you were happy not to get it, because it supported your desire to quit that crappy job and find a better one...

Despite all that, since reading Freud I've found myself paying more attention to my dreams (once you start it's hard to stop) and I've found that his rule does ring true: emotions in dreams are "real", and sometimes they can be important reminders of what you really feel about something.

Most of my dreams have no emotions: I see and hear stuff, but feel very little. But sometimes, maybe one time in ten, they are accompanied by emotions, often very strong ones. These always seem linked to the content of the dream, rather than just being random brain activity: I can't think of a dream in which I was scared of something that I wouldn't normally be scared of, for example.

Generally my dreams have little to do with my real life, but those that do are often the most emotional ones, and it's these that I think provide insights. For example, I've had several dreams in the past six months about running; in every case, they were very happy ones.

Until several months ago I was a keen runner but I've let this slip and got out of shape since. While awake, I've regretted this, a bit, but it wasn't until I reflected on my dreams that I realized how important running was to me and how much I regret giving it up.

While awake, we're always thinking about things on multiple levels: we don't just want X, we think "I want X" (not the same thing), and then we go on to wonder "But should I want X?", "Why do I want X?", "What about Y, would that be better?", etc. Thoughts get piled up on top of one another: it's all very cluttered.

In a dream, most of the layers go silent, and the underlying feeling comes closer to the surface. The principle is the same, in many ways, as this.

But how do I know that feelings in dreams are the "real" ones? In most respects, dreams are less real than waking stuff: we dream about all kinds of crazy stuff. And even if we accept that dreams offer a window into our "underlying" feelings, who's to say that deeper is better or more real?

Well, "buried" feelings matter whenever they're not really buried. If a desire was somehow "repressed" to the point of having no influence at all, it might as well not exist. But my feelings about running were not unconscious as such - I was aware of them before I had these dreams - but I was "repressing" them, not in any mysterious sense, but just in terms of telling myself that it wasn't a big deal, I'd start again soon, I didn't have time, etc.

The problem was that this "repression" was annoying, it was causing long-term frustration etc. In dreams, all of these mild emotions spanning several months were compressed into powerful feelings for the duration of the dream (a few minutes, although the dreams "felt like" they lasted hours).

Overall, I don't think it's possible or useful to interpret dreams as metaphorical representations in a Freudian sense (a train going into a tunnel = sex, or whatever). I suspect that dreams are more or less random activity in the visual and memory areas of the brain. But that doesn't mean they're meaningless: they're activity in your brain, so they can tell you about what you think and feel.

A Tale of Two Genes

An unusually gripping genetics paper from Biological Psychiatry: Pagnamenta et al.

The authors discuss a family where two out of the three children were diagnosed with autism. In 2009, they detected a previously unknown copy number variant mutation in the two affected brothers: a 594 kb deletion knocking out two genes, called DOCK4 and IMMP2L.

Yet this mutation was also carried by their non-autistic mother and sister, suggesting that it wasn't responsible for the autism. The mother's side of the family, however, have a history of dyslexia or undiagnosed "reading difficulties"; all of the 8 relatives with the mutation "performed poorly on reading assessment".

Further investigation revealed that the affected boys also carried a second, entirely separate, novel deletion, affecting the gene CNTNAP5. Their mother and sister did not. This mutation came from their father, who was not diagnosed with autism but apparently had "various autistic traits".

Perhaps it was the combination of the two mutations that caused autism in the two affected boys. The mother's family had a mutation that caused dyslexia; the father's side had one that caused some symptoms of autism but was not, by itself, enough to cause the disorder per se.

However, things aren't so clear. There were cases of diagnosed autism spectrum disorders in the father's family, although few details are given and DNA was only available from one of the father's relatives. So it may have been that the autism was all about the CNTNAP5, and this mutation just has a variable penetrance, causing "full-blown" autism in some people and merely traits in others (like the father).

In order to try to confirm whether these two mutations do indeed cause dyslexia and autism, they searched for them in several hundred unrelated autism and dyslexia patients as well as healthy controls. They detected the a DOCK4 deletion in 1 out of 600 dyslexics (and in his dyslexic father, but not his unaffected sister), but not in 2000 controls. 3 different CNTNAP5 mutations were found in the affected kids from 3 out of 143 autism families, although one of them was also found in over 1000 controls.

This is how psychiatric genetics is shaping up: someone finds a rare mutation in one family, they follow it up, and it's only carried by one out of several hundred other cases. So there are almost certainly hundreds of genes "for" disorders like autism, and it only takes a mutation in one (or two) to cause autism.

Here's another recent example: they found PTCHD1 variants in a full 1% of autism cases. It seems to me that autism, for example, is one of the things that happens when something goes wrong during brain development. Hundreds of genes act in synchrony to build a brain; it only takes one playing out of tune to mess things up, and autism is one common result.

Mental retardation and epilepsy are the other main ones, and we know that there are dozens or hundreds of different forms of these conditions each caused by a different gene or genes. The million dollar question is what it is that makes the autistic brain autistic, as opposed to, say, epileptic.

The "rare variants" model has some interesting implications. The father in the Pagnamenta et al. study had never been diagnosed with anything. He had what the authors call "autistic traits", but presumably he and everyone just thought of those as part of who he was - and they could have been anything from shyness, to preferring routine over novelty, to being good at crosswords.

Had he not carried the
CNTNAP5 mutation, he'd have been a completely different person. He might well have been drawn to a very different career, he'd probably never have married the woman he did, etc.

Of course, that doesn't mean that it's "the gene for being him"; all of his other 23,000 genes, and his environment, came together to make him who he was. But the point is that these differences don't just pile up on top of each other; they interact. One little change can change everything.

Link: BishopBlog on why behavioural genetics is more complicated than some people want you to think.

ResearchBlogging.orgPagnamenta, A., Bacchelli, E., de Jonge, M., Mirza, G., Scerri, T., Minopoli, F., Chiocchetti, A., Ludwig, K., Hoffmann, P., & Paracchini, S. (2010). Characterization of a Family with Rare Deletions in CNTNAP5 and DOCK4 Suggests Novel Risk Loci for Autism and Dyslexia Biological Psychiatry, 68 (4), 320-328 DOI: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2010.02.002

The Horror, The Horror

You're watching a horror movie.

The characters are going about their lives, blissfully unaware that something horrifying is about to happen. You the viewer know that things are going to end badly, though, because you know it's a horror movie.

Someone opens a closet - a bloody corpse could fall out! Or they're drinking a glass of water - which could be infected with a virus! Or they're talking to some guy - who's probably a serial killer! And so on.

The effect of this - and a good director can get a lot of mileage from it - is that scenes which would otherwise be entirely mundane, are experienced as scary, purely because you know that something scary is going to happen, so you see potential horror in every innocent little thing. An expectation as to what's going to happen, leads to you interpreting events in a certain way, and this creates certain emotions.

In a medical context, that would be called a placebo effect. Or a nocebo effect when expectations make people feel worse rather than better.


The horror movie analogy is useful, because it shows that placebo effects don't just happen to other people. We all like to think that if we were given a placebo treatment, we wouldn't be fooled. Unlike all those silly, suggestible, placebo responders, we'd stay as sick as ever until we got a proper cure.

I wouldn't be so sure. We're always interpreting the world around us, and interpreting our own thoughts and feelings, on the basis of our expectations and beliefs about what's going on. We don't suddenly stop doing this when it comes to health.

Suppose you have the flu. You feel terrible, and you're out of aspirin. You don't think you'll be able to make that meeting this afternoon, so you phone in sick.

Now, clearly, flu is a real disease, and it really does make you feel ill. But how do you know that you wouldn't be able to handle the meeting? Unless you have an extensive history of getting the flu in all its various forms, this is an interpretation, a best guess as to what you'll feel in the future, and it might be too pessimistic.

Maybe, if you tried, you'd get on OK. Maybe if you had some aspirin that would reassure you enough to give it a go. And just maybe it would still have worked even if those "aspirins" were just sugar pills...

Link: See my previous posts I Feel X, Therefore Y and How Blind is Double Blind?

I Feel X, Therefore Y

I'm reading Le Rouge et le Noir ("The Red and the Black"), an 1830 French novel by Stendhal...

One passage in particular struck me. Stendhal is describing two characters who are falling in love (mostly); both are young, have lived all their lives in a backwater provincial town, and neither has been well educated.

In Paris, the nature of [her] attitude towards [him] would have very quickly become plain - but in Paris, love is an offspring of the novels. In three or four such novels, or even in a couplet or two of the kind of song they sing at the Gymnase, the young tutor and his shy mistress would have found a clear explanation of their relations with each other. Novels would have traced out a part for them to play, given them a model to imitate.
The idea that reading novels could change the way people fall in love might strange today, but remember that in 1830 the novel as we know it was still a fairly new invention, and was seen in conservative quarters as potentially dangerous. Stendhal was of course pro-novels (he was a novelist), but he accepts that they have a profound effect on the minds of readers.

Notice that his claim is not that novels create entirely new emotions. The two characters had feelings for each other despite never having read any. Novels suggest roles to play and models to follow: in other words, they provide interpretations as to what emotions mean and expectations as to what behaviours they lead to. You feel that, therefore you'll do this.

This bears on many things that I've written about recently. Take the active placebo phenomenon. This refers to cases in which a drug creates certain feelings, and the user interprets these feelings as meaning that "the drug is working", so they expect to improve, which leads them to feel better and behave as if they are getting better.

As I said at the time, active placebos are most often discussed in terms of drug side effects creating the expectation of improvement, but the same thing also happens with real drug effects. Valium (diazepam) produces a sensation of relaxation and reduces anxiety as a direct pharmacological effect but if someone takes it expecting to feel better, this will also drive improvement via expectation: the Valium is working, I can cope with this.

The same process can be harmful, though, and this may be even more common. The cognitive-behavioural theory of recurrent panic attacks is that they're caused by vicious cycles of feelings and expectations. Suppose someone feels a bit anxious, or notices their heart is racing a little. They could interpret that in various ways. They might write it off and ignore it, but they might conclude that they're about to have a panic attack.

If so, that's understandably going to make them more anxious, because panic is horrible. Anxiety causes adrenaline released, the heart beats ever faster etc., and this causes yet more anxiety until a full-blown panic attack occurs. The more often this happens, the more they come to fear even minor symptoms of physical arousal because they expect to suffer panic. Cognitive behavioural therapy for panic generally consists of breaking the cycle by changing interpretations, and by gradual exposure to physical symptoms and "panic-inducing" situations until they no longer cause the expectation of panic.

This also harks back to Ethan Watters' book Crazy Like Us which I praised a few months back. Watters argued that much mental illness is shaped by culture in the following way: culture tells us what to expect and how people behave when they feel distressed in certain ways, and thus channels distress into recognizable "syndromes" - a part to play, a model to imitate, though probably quite unconsciously. The most common syndromes in Western culture can be found in the DSM-IV, but this doesn't mean that they exist in the rest of the world.

Like Stendhal's, this theory does not attempt to explain everything - it assumes that there are fundamental feelings of distress - and I do not think that it explains the core symptoms of severe mental illness such as bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. But people with bipolar and schizophrenia have interpretations and expectations just like everyone else, and these may be very important in determining long-term prognosis. If you expect to be ill forever and never have a normal life, you probably won't.

The World Turned Upside Down

This map is not “upside down”. It looks that way to us; the sense that north is up is a deeply ingrained one. It's grim up north, Dixie is away down south. Yet this is pure convention. The earth is a sphere in space. It has a north and a south, but no up and down.

There’s a famous experiment involving four guys and a door. An unsuspecting test subject is lured into a conversation with a stranger, actually a psychologist. After a few moments, two people appear carrying a large door, and they walk right between the subject and the experimenter.

Behind the door, the experimenter swaps places with one of the door carriers, who may be quite different in voice and appearance. Most subjects don't notice the swap. Perception is lazy: whenever it can get away with it, it merely tells us that things are as we expect, rather than actually showing us stuff. We often do not really perceive things at all. Did the subject really see the first guy? The second? Either?

The inverted map makes us actually see the Earth's geography, rather than just showing us the expected "countries" and "continents". I was struck by how parochial Europe is – the whole place is little more than a frayed end of the vast Eurasian landmass, no more impressive than the one at the other end, Russia's Chukotski. Africa dominates the scene: it can no longer be written off as that poor place at the bottom.

One of the most common observations in psychotherapy of people with depression or anxiety is that they hold themselves to impossibly high standards, although they have a perfectly sensible evaluation of everyone else. Their own failures are catastrophic; other people's are minor setbacks. Other people's successes are well-deserved triumphs; their own are never good enough, flukes, they don't count.

The first step in challenging these unhelpful patterns of thought is to simply point out the double-standard: why are you such a perfectionist about yourself, when you're not when it comes to other people? The idea being to help people to think about themselves in more like healthy way they already think about others. Turn the map of yourself upside down - what do you actually see?

Crazy Like Us

You've probably heard about Crazy Like Us, the new book by Urban Tribes author Ethan Watters. But you probably haven't bought it yet. You really should.

Crazy Like Us is a vivid, humane, and thought-provoking examination of "the globalization of the American psyche" - the process by which, slowly but surely, the world has adopted America's way of thinking about mental illness.

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The key to the American approach is the 844-page Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association - the DSM, or as the saying goes, the Bible of psychiatry. The heart of the DSM is a long list of disorders, each with a code number, and each with an accompanying list of symptoms: Major Depressive Disorder (296.2), Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (309.81), Schizophrenia (295.90), etc. The DSM is more than just a catalogue of names and numbers, however; it's part a conceptual system, a way of deciding what kind of feelings and behaviours are normal, and which are pathological; it's almost a philosophy of life.

On the most straightforward level, Crazy Like Us is the story of how, over the past 20 years, this system has gone from being American to international, displacing the ways of thinking found in other countries and cultures. In four chapters, Watters describes the rise of anorexia in Hong Kong, PTSD in Sri Lanka following the 2004 tsunami, schizophrenia in Madagascar, and major depressive disorder in Japan.

This much is plain fact. The DSM is now the internationally-recognized standard for psychiatric diagnosis; almost all academic papers in psychiatry make use of the American criteria, or the extremely similar ICD-10. What's interesting, however, is Watters' account of how the DSM spread so quickly to other countries, displacing what were - in many cases - equally rich and complex local vocabularies of distress and disorder.

In the case of Japan, Watters' answer is simple: the big drug companies, in the hopes of opening a new market for SSRI antidepressants, promoted the concept of clinical depression as a common ailment, through campaigns in the Japanese media. (Japan did have an "indigenous" concept of depression, utsubyo, but it was seen as a rare, serious disease, like schizophrenia.)

But in "developing" countries, such as Sri Lanka, the picture is rather more complex. Sri Lankans were eager to learn from the West about mental illness because of their respect for Western science and technology. Americans can put people into space - surely, they know a lot about everything, including medicine, including psychiatry.

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Yet there's another level to the story of Crazy Like Us, a more interesting and more controversial one. Watters' argues that the globalization of the American way of thinking has actually changed the nature of "mental illness" around the world. As he puts it:
In the process of teaching the rest of the world to think like us, we’ve been exporting our Western “symptom repertoire” as well. That is, we’ve been changing not only the treatments but also the expression of mental illness in other cultures.
Essentially, mental illness - or at least, much of it - is a way of unconsciously expressing emotional or social distress and tension. Our culture, which includes of course our psychiatric textbooks, tells us various ways in which distress can manifest, provides us with explanations and narratives to make our distress understandable. And so it happens. The symptoms are not acted or "faked" - they're as real to the sufferer as they are to anyone else. But they are culturally shaped.


The historian of psychiatry, Edward Shorter, has written of how, in late 19th century Europe, people (mostly women) were said to be especially prone to suffering from "hysterical paralysis", but every time and place has its own shared "symptom repertoire". Culture does not just create symptoms out of thin air - there has to be some kind of underlying stress. As Watters puts it
We can become psychologically unhinged for many reasons that are common to all, like personal traumas, social upheavals or biochemical imbalances in our brains. ... Whatever the trigger, however, the ill individual and those around him invariably rely on cultural beliefs and stories to understand what is happening.
Watters links anorexia in 1990s Hong Kong to the anxiety caused by the impending transfer of control from Britain to China, a geopolitical event which caused personal worry and social disruption as people or families emigrated. But it was the high-profile 1994 case of a young girl's death from self-starvation, and the subsequent media attention paid to the Western concept of Anorexia Nervosa (DSM code 307.1), that put self-starvation into the symptom repertoire for distressed young women and led to the rise in cases.

The idea that America has exported not just concepts of illness, but illnesses themselves, is a provocative one. Is it true? Commentators have pointed out that Watters' explanation of the rise of anorexia in Hong Kong is rather simplistic. There were many social and cultural changes going on during the 1990s, most of which had nothing to do with the DSM. How do we know that increasing media promotion of dieting, and the fashion for thinness, wasn't also important? In truth, we don't, but I do not think that Watters' argument requires psychiatry to be the only force at work.

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Overall, Crazy Like Us is a fascinating book about transcultural psychiatry and medical anthropology. But it's more than that, and it would be a mistake - and deeply ironic - if we were to see it as a book all about foreigners, "them". It's really about us, Americans and by extension Europeans (although there are some interesting transatlantic contrasts in psychiatry, they're relatively minor.)

If our way of thinking about mental illness is as culturally bound as any other, then our own "psychiatric disorders" are no more eternal and objectively real than those Malaysian syndromes like amok, episodes of anger followed by amnesia, or koro, the fear the that ones genitals are shrinking away.

In other words, maybe patients with "anorexia", "PTSD" and perhaps "schizophrenia" don't "really" have those things at all - at least not if these are thought of as objectively-existing diseases. In which case, what do they have? Do they have anything? And what are we doing to them by diagnosing and treating them as if they did?

Watters' does not discuss such questions; I think this was the right choice, because a full exploration of these issues would fill at least one book in itself. But here are a few thoughts:

First, the most damaging thing about the globalization of Western psychiatric concepts is not so much the concepts themselves, but their tendency to displace and dissolve other ways of thinking about suffering - whether they be religious, philosophical, or just plain everyday talk about desires and feelings. The corollary of this, in terms of the individual Western consumer of the DSM, i.e. you and me, is the tendency to see everything through the lens of the DSM, without realizing that it's a lens, like a pair of glasses that you've forgotten you're even wearing. So long as you keep in mind that it's just one system amongst others, a product of a particular time and place, the DSM is still useful.

Second, if it's true that how we conceptualize illness and suffering affects how we actually feel and behave, then diagnosing or narrativizing mental illness is an act of great importance, and potentially, great harm. We currently spend billions of dollars researching major depressive disorder and schizophrenia, but very little on investigating "major depressive disorder" and "schizophrenia" as diagnoses. Maybe this is an oversight.

Finally, if much "mental illness" is an expression of fundamental distress shaped by the symptom pool of a particular culture, then we need to first map out and understand the symptom pool, and the various kinds of distress, in order to have any hope of making sense of what's going on in any individual on a psychological, social or neurobiological level. To put it another way, you need to understand people before you can understand psychiatry. After reading Crazy Like Us, I think I understand both a little bit better, and I strongly recommend it.

Links:
  • Ethan Watters' Crazy Like Us blog.
  • The Americanization of Mental Illness, Watters' much-read NYT article which is a fine summary of the book's argument, but being so short, misses much of the human detail which make Crazy Like Us so interesting, in particular when Watters is writing about the response of PTSD experts to the 2004 tsunami, and the life of a Madagascan woman with schizophrenia and her family.
  • Exporting American Mental Illness, an excellent discussion of the article over at Neuroanthropology.
  • Did Antidepressants Depress Japan? A 2004 article on the Japanese antidepressants and depression story.

 
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